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INTRODUCTION
Ready or not, securities crowdfunding is about to go live.'
The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 20122
amended federal securities law to allow entrepreneurs to sell
up to $1 million in unregistered securities to the public over the
1. The federal statute authorizing crowdfunding was signed into law by
President Obama in April 2012 and directed the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to issue final regulations by the end of that year.
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(c), 126 Stat.
306, 320 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d). The SEC adopted final rules on
crowdfunding in October 2015. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC
Adopts Rules To Permit Crowdfunding (Oct. 30, 2015), http//www.sec.gov/
news/pressrelease/2015-249.html. The new crowdfunding rules are set to be-
come effective 180 days after publication in the Federal Register, so the first
crowdfunding offerings will likely commence in 2016. JD Alois, Final
Crowdfunding Rules Under Title III of the JOBS Act of 2012, CROWDFUND IN-
SIDER (Oct. 31, 2015, 4:54 PM), http:/www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/10/
76637-final-crowdfunding-rules-under-title-iii-of-the-jobs-act-of-2012/.
2. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, 126 Stat. at 306 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77r, 78a-78o (2012)).
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Internet.3 No longer will an entrepreneur be stymied by a lack
of personal wealth or connections (or proximity to Silicon Val-
ley). Once crowdfunding4 begins, anybody with a startup will
be able to go online and offer a piece of the action to the Ameri-
can people.6 And the community of investors-coined here as
"digital shareholders" 7-will be inclusive and diverse as well.
Through crowdfunding, people of modest means will for the
first time be legally authorized to invest in startups that are
currently offered exclusively to wealthy "accredited" investors.!
This is a compelling vision, one endorsed by a bipartisan
Congress and echoed by a diverse group of states as well as for-
eign countries.! "For the first time," said President Obama
when he signed the JOBS Act, "ordinary Americans will be able
3. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1457, 1458 & n.2 (2013).
4. The term "crowdfunding" has a variety of uses in the field of securities
law. In this Article it is used to refer to financing a business, especially a
startup, pursuant to Title III of the federal JOBS Act of 2012 or analogous leg-
islation. See id. at 1458.
5. Crowdfunding is not legally limited to startup companies; other small
businesses can avail themselves as well. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Rural
Crowdfunding, 13 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 283, 293 (2013) (discussing
crowdfunding as a way for farms to raise capital). The thrust of the legislation,
however, is to assist startups, as is apparent from the fact that JOBS stands
for "Jumpstart Our Business Startups."
6. Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President at JOBS Act
Bill Signing (Apr. 5, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/
04/05/remarks-president-jobs-act-bill-signing ("Because of this bill, start-ups
and small business will now have access to a big, new pool of potential inves-
tors-namely, the American people.").
7. The term "digital shareholder" is new and meant to refer to any
crowdfunding investor, not just those who are "shareholders" in the literal
sense of holding common stock. A person who buys a bond or any other
crowdfunded security is a digital shareholder as the term is coined here.
8. See generally Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 3389 (2013) (explaining how the average investor is limited
to buying public securities while the wealthy accredited investor also has ac-
cess to private markets).
9. As of February 2015, thirteen states and thirty countries had enacted
crowdfunding regimes. Steven Davidoff Solomon, S.E.C.'s Delay on Rules for
Crowdfunding May Just Save It, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2014, at B11;
EUROPEAN CROWDFUNDING NETWORK, ECN REVIEW OF CROWDFUNDING
REGULATION 2014 (Dec. 2014), http://www.eurocrowd.org/2014/12/ecn-review
-crowdfunding-regulation-2014; see also Robert H. Steinhoff, The Next British
Invasion Is Securities Crowdfunding: How Issuing Non-Registered Securities
Through the Crowd Can Succeed in the United States, 86 U. COLO. L. REV.
661, 690-713 (2015) (describing crowdfunding in the United Kingdom).
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to go online and invest in entrepreneurs that they believe in."'0
But can crowdfunding really live up to this sort of rhetoric?
Many legal scholars think crowdfunding will fail and have
made a sport of tallying reasons why: fraud," costs, 2 dilution,"
adverse selection," opportunism," and more."
This Article is different. Rather than hurling another
stone, this Article charts a positive course for crowdfunding to
succeed; a course based on first principles of entrepreneurial
finance. As Professor Ronald Gilson and others have estab-
lished, there are three fundamental problems that all systems
of startup finance must confront and overcome: (1) Uncertainty:
it is impossible to predict how a startup will perform; (2) Infor-
mation asymmetry: entrepreneurs inevitably know much more
than investors about their business; (3) Agency costs: entrepre-
neurs will be tempted to shirk and engage in self-dealing." This
well-known "trio of problems" applies directly to crowdfunding,
10. Press Release, White House, supra note 6; accord 2015 Colo. Sess.
Laws 279-80 (declaring that crowdfunding will "democratize venture capital
formation").
11. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed
at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV.
879, 935 (2011) (expressing concern over "the capacity for fraud in
crowdfunding"); see also Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding?
Social Networks and the Securities Laws-Why the Specially Tailored Exemp-
tion Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735,
1769 (2012) (discussing crowdfunding and concluding "that social media tech-
nologies increase ... the potential for fraud").
12. See, e.g., Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory
Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 284-85 (2014); Robert B. Thompson &
Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepre-
neurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1605 (2013).
13. See, e.g., John S. (Jack) Wroldsen, The Social Network and the
Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin, and Venture Capitalists' Dilution of the
Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 616 (2013).
14. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for
Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 561, 601-02 (2015); see also Michael B. Dorff, The
Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 J. CORP. L. 493, 513 (2014); Gmeleen
Faye B. Tomboc, The Lemons Problem in Crowdfunding, 30 J. MARSHALL J.
INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 253, 266-69 (2013).
15. See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities
Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 106-07.
16. See, e.g., Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding
and Online Auction IPOs, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 217, 251-58 (claiming that
"[eiquity [c]rowdfunding [ils (dloomed" for a half-dozen independent reasons).
17. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from
the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003); see Robert P.
Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 41 n.9 (2006) ("This model ... can be found
in virtually any academic discussion . . . .").
612 [ 100:609
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where they will present themselves in "extreme form" due to
the very early stage of the startups involved.'8
Thus the important question this Article addresses is
whether crowdfunding can respond to these three fundamental
problems in an efficient way. Indeed, the various academic cri-
tiques can generally be categorized as claims that one or anoth-
er of the trio of problems will prove intractable for
crowdfunding. For example, those who predict adverse selection
are worried about information asymmetry;" those who predict
fraud are concerned about agency costs.20 Rather than taking
them one at a time, this Article systematically examines the
three fundamental challenges of entrepreneurial finance in the
context of crowdfunding.
Part I provides a primer on crowdfunding, describing the
authorizing legislation and its underlying policies. Part II then
introduces the trio of problems, namely uncertainty, infor-
mation asymmetry, and agency costs, and predicts how they
will reveal themselves in crowdfunding, setting the stage for
the heart of the Article in Parts III and IV.
Part III takes a close look at the way in which three tradi-
tional forms of entrepreneurial finance-venture capital (VC),
angel investing, and public companies-have addressed the trio
of problems. Can any of the tools honed and perfected over the
years in these three contexts be applied to crowdfunding? Un-
fortunately, the mechanisms used in these traditional forms of
entrepreneurial finance will not translate well to crowdfunding.
While a handful appear to hold some relevance for
crowdfunding, none of the strongest methods used by VCs, an-
gels, or public shareholders to address the trio of problems hold
much promise for crowdfunding. For example, VCs and angel
investors participate actively in their portfolio companies, in
part to monitor management, but this is not possible for the
crowd. Similarly, public shareholders depend on mandatory
disclosure, but the signature move of crowdfunding is to ex-
empt these securities from the usual disclosure requirements.
In short, merely emulating what has worked in the past will
likely prove insufficient for crowdfunding to succeed. New ideas
are needed.
18. Gilson, supra note 17; see Ibrahim, supra note 14, at 573-76 (applying
Gilson's framework to crowdfunding).
19. See Ibrahim, supra note 14 (discussing information asymmetry).
20. See infra Part II.C (discussing examples of fraud).
20151 613
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The primary contribution of this Article thus comes in Part
IV, which describes a set of five novel methods for addressing
uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs in the
crowdfunding context. These novel mechanisms are not taken
from traditional sources but rather are designed specifically for
crowdfunding's distinctive digital context.
First, crowdfunding can use the wisdom of the crowd to
distinguish between promising and poor investments. Second,
digital shareholders can work together to crowdsource invest-
ment analysis on the Internet.22 Third, the promoters and man-
agement of a crowdfunding company will have their online rep-
utation at stake, giving them an incentive to act fairly and
properly.23 Fourth, crowdfunding companies can use securities-
based compensation, whereby management would be paid in
the security being offered to the crowd. Fifth, digital monitor-
ing mechanisms can effectively address agency costs in
crowdfunding companies at low cost. 2 ' Collectively these solu-
tions provide a sound foundation for crowdfunding to function
and even thrive.
This Article makes at least three novel contributions to the
literature: First, it systematically analyzes the three funda-
mental problems of finance in the context of crowdfunding.6
Second, it examines the solutions employed in the analogous
contexts of VC, angel investing, and public companies, and de-
termines their relevance for crowdfunding." Third, and most
importantly, it introduces a novel set of "digital" methods to
address the three challenges that are well-suited to
crowdfunding's institutional context.28
I. INTRODUCTION TO CROWDFUNDING
The idea of allowing startups and small businesses to use
the Internet to raise capital originated in the 1990s,29 but it was
not until the 2010s that securities crowdfunding was finally au-
21. Infra Part IV.A.
22. Infra Part IV.B.
23. Infra Part V.C.
24. Infra Part IV.D.
25. Infra Part IV.E.
26. Infra Part II.
27. Infra Part III.
28. Infra Part IV.
29. E.g., Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business
Capital Barrier?, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 57 (1998).
614 [ 100:609
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thorized by federal and state legislation.3 0 This Part introduces
the concept of securities crowdfunding and the recent legal re-
forms that brought it into being. It also describes the compel-
ling inclusive vision that crowdfunding offers to both entrepre-
neurs and investors.
A. CROWDFUNDING SECURITIES
Securities crowdfunding is a new idea that builds off of the
earlier concept of crowdsourcing." Crowdsourcing is where the
public-the "crowd"-is invited to contribute to an online pro-
ject without compensation.3 2 Wikipedia is a famous example of
an Internet-based encyclopedia, in which many workers, each
33
adding just a bit, collectively created an amazing resource.
Crowdfunding differs from crowdsourcing in that the crowd is
asked to contribute money rather than labor. To date, most
crowdfunding projects have been in the form of "reward"
crowdfunding where, in return for capital, the funding partici-
pants receive the fruits of the project, such as a book, CD, or
video game. Websites such as Kickstarter have been doing
reward crowdfunding for the past five years, during which time
it has quickly grown into a $2 billion market.30
Securities crowdfunding also will take place on the Inter-
net but will take the concept one step further. Funding partici-
pants will receive a security, such as a share of stock, a bond, or
any other investment contract. For example, in exchange for
an investment of $100, each investor might receive a share in a
rock band's profits from their upcoming tour, which is itself fi-
nanced through these investments. Until the passage of recent
30. See Ibrahim, supra note 14, at 587 ("Twelve states have evidently
tired of waiting for the SEC to act on Title III and have implemented their
own intrastate Title III-like exemptions.").
31. See generally DAREN C. BRABHAM, CROWDSOURCING 2-4 (2013) (offer-
ing a formal definition of crowdsourcing); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1459-77
(defining securities crowdfunding and providing background information).
32. See Crowdsourcing, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Crowdsourcing (last visited Nov. 2, 2015); infra Part IV.B. See generally
BRABHAM, supra note 31, at 12-13 (describing the internet's ability to foster
dialogue).
33. See Wikipedia, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia
(last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
34. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1459.
35. See id. at 1459-60.
36. See Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats (last
visited Nov. 2, 2015) (listing $2 billion pledged on Kickstarter since inception).
37. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1459-60.
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federal legislation as discussed immediately below, however,
crowdfunding securities in this way would violate the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 as an unregistered public offering.38 The law al-
lows a person to solicit investments from the public if all that is
promised is a CD or concert tickets, as in the case of reward
crowdfunding.3' But in order to sell securities to the public, the
Securities Act generally mandates that you first register the
securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), otherwise the securities can be cancelled and the money
returned. 4 0 That is, unless the offering is made under an "ex-
emption" found in the Securities Act.
"Exempt" offerings are exactly what they sound like; offer-
ings of securities without prior registration. Two important and
long-standing exemptions are the private placement exemption,
where one offers securities to an exclusive group of family and
friends,4 ' and the accredited investor exemption, where one
sells securities solely to wealthy people ("accredited" inves-
tors).42 Title III of the federal JOBS Act (also known as the
CROWDFUND Act) added a new exemption for crowdfunded
securities to this list,4 3 pending the promulgation of regulations
by the SEC.44 In addition to that federal regime, a diverse group
of states have recently used the existing intrastate exemption
to create an in-state crowdfunding regime.45
These new laws authorize the crowdfunding of any type of
security, including common stock, preferred stock, bonds, or
any sort of "investment contract."4 6 This author has opined that
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
39. Purchasing a CD or concert tickets from a reward crowdfunding web-
site would not qualify as a "security" under the Securities Act, and was al-
lowed before the recent legislative changes. Edmund W. Kitch, Crowdfunding
and an Innovator's Access to Capital, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 887, 890 (2014).
40. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77t, 77h-1.
41. Id. § 77d(a)(2).
42. Id. § 77d(a)(5). To qualify as an accredited investor, one must general-
ly possess a net worth that exceeds $1,000,000 (excluding one's primary resi-
dence) or an annual income that exceeds $200,000 individually or $300,000
jointly for each of the past two years. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)-(6) (2015).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6). The CROWDFUND Act is Title III of the broad-
er "JOBS Act," which entered into law in April 2012. Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 301, 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012)).
44. See supra note 1.
45. See supra note 30.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); see S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-
99 (1946) (defining "investment contract").
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debt may be an attractive type of security to crowdfund,47 but
many others expect that equity will play the primary role, as it
has in the traditional contexts of VCs, angels, and public com-
*48panies.
The federal CROWDFUND Act includes a number of limi-
tations on the crowdfunding of securities,9 including the follow-
ing: Companies may not raise more than $1 million annually
via crowdfunding.o Investors may only invest a maximum of
5% of their annual income or net worth in all crowdfunded se-
curities each year.5 Crowdfunding transactions must be con-
ducted through an intermediary broker dealer or "funding por-
tal." Issuers may not advertise to the public directly.
Investors who have pledged to invest may cancel their com-
mitment before the deal closes.
The emphasis of the statute (and this Article) is on startup
companies, although this is not a strict requirement." Almost
any corporation or other business organized under state law
will be authorized to issue securities through crowdfunding.
The exceptions are publicly traded companies, investment com-
panies, and foreign companies, all of which are prohibited from
employing the crowdfunding exemption. 6
Crowdfunding issuers must provide some basic disclosures
to the public, including (a) the name, address, and website of
the company; (b) the names of directors, officers, and substan-
tial investors; (c) a description of the business and the antici-
47. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1488-89.
48. See, e.g., Parsont, supra note 12, at 289-90 (predicting the growth of
"equity-based sites"). This Article addresses itself to the crowdfunding of any
and all types of securities. However, because of the overriding importance of
equity (including securities convertible to equity) to the traditional modes of
entrepreneurial finance-VCs, angels and public companies-this Article dis-
cusses, where appropriate, concepts that are relevant only to equity securities.
See, e.g., infra Part IlI.C.4 (discussing shareholder derivative actions); infra
Part III.C.7 (discussing appraisal and Weinberger). A discussion specific to
debt-based crowdfunding is beyond the scope of the present Article but would
appear to be a worthy subject of future work.
49. For a more complete discussion, see Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1460-
66.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A).
51. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i). Wealthy investors can invest up to 10%. Id.
§ 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii).
52. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(C).
53. Id. § 77d-1(b)(2).
54. Id. § 77d-1(a)(7).
55. See supra note 4.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(f).
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pated business plan; and (d) a description of the issuer's finan-
cial condition." Issuers must also provide a description of the
purpose and intended use of the proceeds, the target offering
amount, the price of the securities to be offered, and a descrip-
tion of the ownership and capital structure of the issuer. Fol-
lowing a crowdfunding round, an issuer must annually file with
the SEC, and make available to investors, financial statements
and a report on the results of operations."
Issuers are prohibited from advertising the offering them-
selves, and any solicitation of the offering must go through the
registered funding portal.0 Crowdfunded securities cannot be
transferred or sold by investors for one year after the date of
purchase, unless being transferred to the issuer, as part of an
offering registered by the SEC, or to an accredited investor or
family member."' The CROWDFUND Act authorizes civil ac-
tions for fraud against issuers, directors, and officers. Finally,
the Act expressly prohibits the several states from adding addi-
tional reporting requirements for crowdfunded securities.
The SEC recently promulgated "Regulation
Crowdfunding," as commanded by the CROWDFUND Act.6 4
Once the SEC's final regulations go into effect in 2016, inter-
state crowdfunding will commence.
On the state level, more than a dozen have enacted legisla-
tion or administrative rules authorizing securities
crowdfunding within their borders,66 pursuant to the venerable
57. Id. § 77d-1(b)(1). The disclosure requirements concerning the financial
condition of the issuer vary depending on the size of the offering. Offerings
under $100,000 must provide income tax returns for the last fiscal year and
unaudited financial statements certified as accurate by the principle executive
officer. For offerings over $100,000 and up to $500,000, financial statements
reviewed by an independent public accountant are required. For offerings
greater than $500,000, audited financial statements are required. Id. § 77d-
1(b)(1)()(i)-iii).
58. Issuers must also announce the deadline to reach their target
amounts and provide regular updates regarding their progress toward meeting
their target amounts. Id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(E)-(H). If the issuer fails to reach the
goal, the whole transaction is cancelled. Id. § 77d-1(a)(7).
59. Id. § 77d-1(b)(4).
60. Id. § 77d-1(b)(2).
61. Id. § 77d-1(e).
62. Id. § 77d-1(c)(1)-(3).
63. Id. § 77r(a)(1), (b)(4)(C).
64. See supra note 1.
65. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 1.
66. Thirteen states had enacted intrastate crowdfunding rules as of No-
vember 2014. Davidoff Solomon, supra note 9.
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intrastate exemption." This is a diverse group of states, both
geographically and politically, including Colorado," Georgia,"
Massachusetts," Michigan,7 ' Tennessee12 and Texas." All of
these intrastate schemes bear a close resemblance to the feder-
al CROWDFUND Act, albeit with small changes here and
there. For instance, several states increased the maximum
amount issuers can raise to $2 million, rather than $1 million
as in the federal act. 74 These modest changes do not affect the
basic character of crowdfunding securities, and they need not
be elaborated further.
The important point for present purposes is that the rapid
adoption of crowdfunding legislation across a wide variety of
states indicates a high level of enthusiasm for this new method
of financing startups. Indeed, many of these intrastate
crowdfunding schemes were enacted as a direct result of frus-
tration with the SEC's delay in implementing the
CROWDFUND Act. These various state legislatures want
crowdfunding to begin as soon as possible for their constituen-
cies, which is a strong vote of support for the vision of
crowdfunding, the subject of the next Section.
B. THE VISION OF CROWDFUNDING
Crowdfunding offers a compelling and inclusive vision that
promises benefits for investors, entrepreneurs, and the econo-
my as a whole. This is why the federal JOBS Act passed with a
large bipartisan majority and why so many states have enacted
intrastate crowdfunding regimes of their own.
Crowdfunding has two primary goals, one relating to en-
trepreneurs and one relating to investors. First, crowdfunding
can empower entrepreneurs from coast to coast to use social
networks and the Internet to obtain business capital at a rea-
sonable cost. Second, crowdfunding can democratize the market
67. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11).
68. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-308.5 (2015).
69. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2-.08 (2012).
70. 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 14.402(B)(13)(o) (2015).
71. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.2102a (2015).
72. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1-103(a)(13)(A) (2014).
73. 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.25 (2014).
74. E.g., WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1)(b) (2014).
75. See, e.g., Lee Schafer, State Can't Wait for Feds on This Kind of Fund-
raiser, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Nov. 12, 2014, at Dl; Davidoff Solomon, su-
pra note 9 ("While the Securities and Exchange Commission dawdles, states
are rushing to adopt their own crowdfunding rules.").
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for financing speculative companies by inviting ordinary peo-
ple-"digital shareholders"-to make investments that are cur-
rently offered solely to accredited (wealthy) investors.
1. Startup Nation"
There is widespread agreement that entrepreneurship is
vital to innovation, economic growth, and employment in the
contemporary United States. 7 Startups in their first year have
reportedly been responsible for all net job creation in the Unit-
ed States since at least the 1970s, having added about three
million jobs per year, even during recessions. Startups are
similarly important for innovation and general economic
growth.7 9 Although many of these start-ups eventually fold,"
those that survive are often the type of companies that create
satisfying employment opportunities and whose products or
services improve our quality of life.'
Our leaders and policy makers have long understood the
importance of entrepreneurship to a thriving economy and soci-
ety. President Obama has said that "entrepreneurialism is the
key to our continued global leadership and the success of our
people."" In the same vein, Congress has twice declared that "it
is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Gov-
ernment to . .. provide an opportunity for entrepreneur-
ship ... and the creation and growth of small businesses."8 3
76. See generally DAN SENOR & SAUL SINGER, START-UP NATION (2009)
(describing Israel's startup culture).
77. E.g., Barack Obama, Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 18, 2011, at A17; Ruth Simon & Caelainn Barr, Endangered Spe-
cies: Young U.S. Entrepreneurs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3-4, 2015, at Al ("It's part
of the vitality of this country to have people starting new businesses and try-
ing new things." (quoting Harvard Business School Professor John Davis)).
78. See TIM KANE, KAUFFMAN FOUND., THE IMPORTANCE OF STARTUPS IN
JOB CREATION AND JOB DESTRUCTION 2-6 (2010).
79. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 631a(a) (2012) (declaring a congressional policy of
fostering small business growth).
80. See Steve Lohr, To Create Jobs, Nurture Start-Ups, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
12, 2010, at BU3.
81. See id. ("[Small businesses that survive] are prime candidates
to ... make an outsize contribution to innovation, productivity gains and job
growth . . . .").
82. Obama, supra note 77; accord President Barack Obama, State of the
Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), reprinted in 156 CONG. REC. 790 (2010) (stat-
ing that "most new jobs" start in "companies that begin when an entrepreneur
takes a chance on a dream or a worker decides it's time she became her own
boss").
83. 15 U.S.C. § 631a(a); accord id. § 631(a).
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And this has not been empty rhetoric: A portion of all federal
contract dollars are statutorily required to go to small busi-
nesses, and the Small Business Administration guarantees
loans for small businesses and provides free counseling and
training to entrepreneurs.84 Similarly, state and local govern-
ments expend resources attracting entrepreneurs to their
communities.5 In short, entrepreneurship is in the public in-
terest and start-up companies are actively encouraged as a
matter of public policy.
Yet even as we recognize that entrepreneurship is so im-
portant to a thriving economy and society, we must also
acknowledge that startups commonly have great difficulty ob-
taining the financing they need.8 6 This lack of access to financ-
ing disproportionately affects certain types of entrepreneurs,
namely those that are "out-of-the-loop" for one reason or anoth-
er and do not have connections with angel investors or other
wealthy financiers.
The traditional first source for entrepreneurial financing is
from the entrepreneur's friends and family, as well as their
own personal savings.7 Most people, however, have negligible
personal savings, and the same can be said of their friends, so
it comes down to whether the entrepreneur has a wealthy rela-
tive. Moving beyond friends and family, a bank is another po-
tential source of startup capital. In practice, however, banks
are generally hesitant to extend credit to startup companies in
their earliest stages, as the risk is simply too high."8 Many en-
84. See What We Do, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/about
-sba/what-we-do (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
85. See, e.g., Patrick McGeehan, Hoping To Lure Tech Jobs, City Seeks a
Partner To Open a Graduate School of Engineering, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010,
at A34 (noting that a desire to spawn "technology-based start-up companies"
in New York is behind the city's willingness to "make a significant investment"
in an engineering school).
86. Simon & Barr, supra note 77 ("Many banks that pulled back on small-
business lending during the recession that stretched from December 2007 to
June 2009 have continued to keep lending standards tight."); see PERI PAKROO,
THE WOMEN'S SMALL BUSINESS START-up KIT 98-99 (2010) (noting banks' re-
luctance to lend to first-time entrepreneurs).
87. PAKROO, supra note 86, at 104; see Angus Loten, For Startups, Self-
Reliance Comes at a Cost, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2015, at B5 (reporting on entre-
preneurs' increasing reliance on personal finances in recent years).
88. RHONDA ABRAMS, THE OWNER'S MANUAL FOR SMALL BUSINESS 215-
16 (2005); PAKROO, supra note 86; Ruth Simon & Angus Loten, Small-
Business Lending Stuck in the Slow Lane, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2014, at Al
("The number of loans for $1 million or less held by banks is down about 14%
to 23.5 million since 2008.").
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trepreneurs use credit cards for startup financing,89 but the
high interest rate and relatively low limits mean that other fi-
nancing sources are needed.
Another option is to obtain capital from professional early-
stage investors, such as angel investors or venture capital
funds. But there is tremendous competition for such invest-
ments and such investors are interested in certain types of
companies, often in limited geographic areas. Importantly, an-
gels and VCs rely heavily on connections, making it difficult to
get funded in the absence of pre-existing relationships with
such investors or their acquaintances.90
Furthermore, the investing approach and expectations of
VCs can shape the types of companies that get funded. In par-
ticular, VCs tend to seek "scalable" businesses, not ordinary
brick-and-mortar companies, even profitable ones.9 ' While this
may make good sense as a business matter, the effect is that
companies in certain lines of business generally cannot attract
the attention of VCs.
Finally, an entrepreneur could attempt to obtain capital
from the public through an initial public offering (IPO). An
IPO, however, implicates the heart of the Securities Act's regis-
tration provisions, as well as the many regulations promulgat-
ed thereunder. As a result, compliance costs for an IPO can eas-
ily run to several million dollars,2 making an IPO economically
infeasible for nearly all early-stage startups.
To sum up, many entrepreneurs have great difficulty fi-
nancing startup companies. Even worse, this problem appears
to be exacerbated for women and racial minorities. The litera
89. ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION 228 (2000) ("[Clredit
cards have become the number one source of financing for small businesses-
supplanting bank loans in the late 1990s."); Andrew A. Schwartz, Old Enough
To Fight, Old Enough To Swipe: A Critique of the Infancy Rule in the Federal
Credit CARD Act, 2011 UTAHL. REV. 407, 428.
90. See Loten, supra note 87 (reporting on "the clubby venture-capital
world," the importance of connections and introductions, and the reality that
finding VC funding is challenging for those who are "not very well connected").
91. Abraham J.B. Cable, Incubator Cities: Tomorrow's Economy, Yester-
day's Start-Ups, 2. MICH. J. PRIv. EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 195, 229 (2013).
92. Carlos Berdej6, Going Public After the JOBS Act, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1,
49 (2015) (reporting that the average regulatory compliance costs total about
$3.5 million for small issuers going public in an IPO).
93. See, e.g., PAKROO, supra note 86, at 96-100 (describing special difficul-
ties of female entrepreneurs); ALICIA ROBB, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., ACCESS
TO CAPITAL AMONG YOUNG FIRMS, MINORITY-OWNED FIRMS, WOMEN-OWNED
FIRMs, AND HIGH-TECH FIRMS 2-3 (Apr. 2013).
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ture in the area shows that most startups founded by African-
Americans receive little or no outside financing from any
source, indicating a severe lack of access to startup financing.9 4
In a similar vein, only about 7% of venture capital funds go to
women-led businesses" and less than 1% go to businesses
founded by African-Americans. 6
Geographical constraints similarly hinder some entrepre-
neurs, especially because angel investors and venture capital-
ists tend to stay close to home.97 A startup based in San Fran-
cisco has a better chance of being funded than one based in
Toledo simply because there is a much larger community of po-
tential funders in the former. More generally, rural entrepre-
neurs are at a distinct disadvantage compared with their urban
counterparts.
94. E.g., Paroma Sanyal & Catherine L. Mann, The Financial Structure of
Startup Firms: The Role ofAssets, Information, and Entrepreneur Characteris-
tics 15-16 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 10-17, Dec. 2010)
("[S]tartups owned by African-American entrepreneurs have a lower probabil-
ity of having any type of external finance, especially external equity, and in-
stead finance their firms through personal resources. Based on odds ratios, we
find that such businesses are . . . 98 percent less likely to use external equity,
compared to using internal equity." (emphasis omitted)).
95. Hollie Slade, Why Is It So Hard for Female Entrepreneurs To Get VC
Funding? Could Crowdfunding Be the Answer?, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2013, 10:00
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/hollieslade/2013/11/29/why-is-it-so-hard-for
-female-entrepreneurs-to-get-vc-funding-could-crowdfunding-be-the-answer;
see Richard T. Harrison & Colin M. Mason, Does Gender Matter? Women Busi-
ness Angels and the Supply of Entrepreneurial Finance, 31 ENTREPRENEUR-
SHIP THEORY & PRAC. 445, 449-50 (2007) (finding that women comprise a sim-
ilarly small percentage of angel investors). But cf. Sanyal & Mann, supra note
94, at 16 ("In contrast to other research, women owners do not show a differ-
ent financial structure from startups where the primary owner is male." (em-
phasis omitted)).
96. Venture Capital Demographics-87% of VC-Backed Founders Are
White; All-Asian Teams Raise Largest Funding Rounds, CB INSIGHTS
(Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.cbinsights.com/blog/venture-capital-demographics
-87-percent-vc-backed-founders-white-asian-teams-raise-largest-funding.
97. See RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS ... AND How
IT'S TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 50-51
(2002); Andrew Wong, Angel Finance: The Other Venture Capital, in VENTURE
CAPITAL 71, 73 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2010) (explaining that angel investors
tend to limit their investments to startups within a three-hour drive); Randall
Stross, It's Not Who You Know. It's Where You Are, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006,
at BU3 (reporting that some venture capital firms in Silicon Valley adhere to a
"twenty minute rule," which provides that "if a start-up company seeking ven-
ture capital is not within a 20-minute drive of the venture firm's offices, it will
not be funded").
98. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 287.
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Youthful entre preneurs likewise have exceptional difficulty
finding financing.' This is especially unfortunate, as young
people are known to challenge orthodox thinking and may be
able to offer fresh, new solutions to vexing problems.100
Crowdfunding offers a new and inclusive way to bring
needed financing to startups all across America, from coast to
coast, in rural areas and urban, to entrepreneurs rich and poor,
young and old, men and women of every race, ethnicity, and re-
ligion. Because it is Internet-based and so much less costly
than a traditional public offering, crowdfunding will provide an
opportunity for anyone with an idea to go online and seek fund-
ing to make it a reality. Not just those in Silicon Valley; not
just those with wealthy friends; not just those with connections.
Crowdfunding will be open to anyone and can thereby create a
startup nation where every state and locality, and every field of
endeavor,' is the subject of active entrepreneurship.
Is this inclusive vision realistic? Based on results in reward
crowdfunding and related fields, there is good reason to expect
it to come to fruition. Consider the issue of female and minority
entrepreneurs, who have long had a more difficult time obtain-
ing financing from traditional sources such as banks.102 In re-
ward crowdfunding, by contrast, it turns out that female found-
ers are "considerably more likely to successful [sic] raise capital
than male founders," all else being equal.' Similarly, in the re-
lated field of peer-to-peer lending, where consumers make
online loans to one another, lenders are less influenced by ra-
cial and other stereotypes than are banks and other traditional
99. Andrew A. Schwartz, Teenage Crowdfunding, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 515,
521-23 (2014); Simon & Barr, supra note 77.
100. Schwartz, supra note 99, at 518.
101. Crowdfunding may not be appropriate for every type of business. For
one important example, ventures that are heavily dependent on intellectual
property, such as a new invention, may wish to avoid crowdfunding so as not
to give away their valuable secrets. They may be better off looking for VC or
angel funding and requiring that potential investors sign a non-disclosure
agreement, an action that would be infeasible or ineffective in the
crowdfunding context. Alternatively, such ventures may be able to avoid giv-
ing away secrets by providing the crowd with only vague information.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
103. Jason Greenberg & Ethan Mollick, Leaning in or Leaning on? Gender,
Homophily, and Activism in Crowdfunding (July 3, 2014) (unpublished manu-
script) (emphasis omitted), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2462254; cf Slade, supra
note 95 ("Crowdfunding eliminates bias ... allowing true market interest to
decide which ideas live or die.").
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financial institutions.'" These bits of evidence buttress the ex-
pectation that crowdfunding will be more egalitarian and inclu-
sive than traditional forms of business finance.
To summarize this Subsection: the first goal of
crowdfunding is to create an inclusive culture of entrepreneur-
ship open to all Americans and, considering the above discus-
sion, crowdfunding is well positioned to meet this goal.
2. Digital Shareholders
The second goal of crowdfunding is to democratize the
market for investing in startup companies. For decades, the
chance to invest in private startups has been legally available
only to wealthy investors and friends of the founders.o' This
differential treatment between the wealthy and the rest was an
artifact of two exemptions embedded in federal securities law.
First, the law has always exempted private offerings from
the registration requirement, that is, offerings made available
to an exclusive group of known people, not the general public.06
Second, there is a longstanding exemption for offerings made
only to wealthy investors that are "accredited" by the SEC to
make such investments.o' This latter exemption dates back to
an SEC regulation adopted in 1982, which clarified that
wealthy people-those with a net worth of more than $1 mil-
lion-were deemed to be "accredited."0 8
The practical effect of these two exemptions is that entre-
preneurs do everything they can to avoid making an offering to
the public' and instead sell unregistered securities of their
startup companies only to people that come within either the
private offering exemption (family and friends) or the accredit-
104. Michal Herzenstein et al., The Democratization of Personal Consumer
Loans? Determinants of Success in Online Peer-to-Peer Loan Auctions 31
(Feb. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http:/www.rice.edu/nationalmedial
multimedia/online.
105. See Rodrigues, supra note 8, at 3389 ("Securities law's dirty little se-
cret is that rich investors have access to special kinds of investments . . . that
everyone else does not.").
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012) (exempting certain transactions from
prohibitions relating to the sale of transactions).
107. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2013); see 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2).
108. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a)(5), 230.215(e).
109. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, "Publicness" in
Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337,
338 (2013) (recounting Facebook's efforts to avoid an initial public offering).
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ed investor exemption (the wealthy)."o Non-millionaires have
been left out, effectively barred from investing in strangers'
startup companies, thanks to this regulatory apparatus.
Crowdfunding is designed to break down this barrier by
empowering ordinary non-accredited investors-"digital share-
holders""'-to take a chance and invest in the same type of un-
registered securities of a stranger's startup.1 2 Digital share-
holders will be skilled with the Internet and open to new
things-after all, they tried crowdfunding.
Digital shareholders will likely be a diverse community," 3
simply because it will be open to anyone and everyone."4 This
prediction is buttressed by the current experience in reward
crowdfunding, where the community of investors is diverse, at
least in terms of demographics. Backers come from every in-
come level, with half of backers making under $50,000 per
year."' Women comprise almost half of the backers on
Kickstarter.n' Kickstarter is accessible to people of every age,
ethnicity, and political persuasion." 7
110. Press Release, White House, supra note 6 ("Right now, you can only
turn to a limited group of investors-including banks and wealthy individu-
als-to get funding. Laws that are nearly eight decades old make it impossible
for others to invest.").
111. The term "shareholder" is used loosely here to include investors hold-
ing any type of security, not just common stock. See supra note 7.
112. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,429 n.12 (proposed Nov. 5,
2013) (notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 200, 227, 232, 239-240, 249) ("[C]rowdftmding is premised on permitting
sales of securities to any interested person, not just to investors who meet spe-
cific qualifications, such as accredited investors."); Andrew A. Schwartz, Inclu-
sive Crowdfunding, 2016 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 13)("Inclusivity is part of the essential nature of securities crowdfunding; it is
what makes crowdfunding different from other methods of selling securities.").
113. This does not mean to assert that Americans will participate in line
with overall demography, merely that the overall group of digital shareholders
will likely be diverse in many ways.
114. JAMES SUROwIEcKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: HOW THE MANY ARE
SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND How COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS,
ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES AND NATIONS 31 (2004) ("[Tlhe sheer size of most
markets, coupled with the fact that anyone with money can enter them (you
don't need to be admitted or hired), means that a certain level of diversity is
almost guaranteed.").
115. Nick Littlefield, Kickstats: 4 Things You Need To Know About the De-
mographics of Crowdfunding, CROWDLIFTED (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www
.crowdlifted.com/news/2013/11kickstats-4-things-you-need-to-know-about-the
-demographics-of-crowdfunding#.
116. Dan Marom, Alicia Robb & Orly Sade, Gender Dynamics in
Crowdfunding (Kickstarter): Evidence on Entrepreneurs, Investors, Deals and
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Digital shareholders will be particularly diverse compared
to the traditional sources of entrepreneurial financing, angel
investors, venture capitalists and public shareholders."' Angel
groups and VC funds are made up exclusively of accredited in-
vestors."' Crowdfunding will be open to everyone.1 2 0 Angels and
VCs tend to invest in certain geographic areas, including Sili-
con Valley and New York. '2 Crowdfunding will be a nationwide
(or statewide) market available to anyone with an Internet
connection.1 2 2 Digital shareholders will likely be even more di-
verse than shareholders of public companies. The shareholder
base of large public companies these days is primarily made up
of institutional entities.22 Retail investors trading shares for
their own account comprises a rather small share of the con-
temporary public market.1 24 Crowdfunding will present the op-
Taste Based Discrimination 7 (Mar. 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2442954.
117. See Littlefield, supra note 115 (suggesting that people of diverse back-
grounds participate in crowdfunding through Kickstarter).
118. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,434 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013)
(notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,
227, 232, 239-240, 249) ("Congress intended for investment opportunities
through crowdfunding transactions . . . to be available to all types of inves-
tors . . . ."); Wroldsen, supra note 13, at 611 ("Crowdfunding brings the masses
of everyday retail investors into what historically has been the nearly exclu-
sive domain of venture capitalists and other wealthy investors.").
119. Rodrigues, supra note 8, at 3397-402 (describing the role of angel and
VC investors in accredited investing).
120. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,431.
121. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 283-84.
122. This represents just about everyone, as more than 98% of Americans
can reportedly access the Internet by either wired or wireless connection. EX-
EC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COMMUNITY-BASED BROADBAND SOLUTIONS 3
(2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defaultifiles/docs/community-based
broadband report.byexecutiveoffice ofthepresident.pdf THOM FILE &
CAMILLE RYAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2013 (2014), http-//www.census.gov/history/pdf/2013computer
use.pdf (reporting that about three-quarters of American households have In-
ternet access at home).
123. Institutional investors hold 70% of the shares of the largest public
companies. Paul H. Edelman et al., Shareholder Voting in an Age of Interme-
diary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1361 n.9 (2014) (citing CONFER-
ENCE BD., THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET AL-
LOCATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION 22 tbl.10, 27 tbl.13 (2010)); see
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 863, 875 (2013) ("Put graphically but not metaphorically, representatives
of institutions that collectively represent effective control of many large U.S.
corporations could fit around a boardroom table.").
124. See Edelman et al., supra note 123.
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posite situation, for the entire body of investors will be individ-
ual digital shareholders.""
The inclusive vision of crowdfunding has been criticized by
some as nothing more than a nefarious scheme to give "middle
class families the same opportunities that millionaires have
always had to lose their money."1 26 While it is true that many
crowdfunded companies will surely fail, it seems only fair to
give everyone, not just the wealthy and connected, the freedom
to take their chances and invest a small amount in what they
hope will be the next Uber.'27
Will non-accredited, retail investors take advantage of this
opportunity to become digital shareholders? It seems likely
they will. Consider the very existence of the securities laws.
The underlying concern of the 1933 and 1934 Acts was that
people will gladly hand their money over to entrepreneurs if al-
lowed to do so." Those laws, including the registration re-
quirement, erected a barricade between untested startup com-
panies and retail investors that has stood for almost a
century. '2 The JOBS Act drills a hole in that wall.o There is
125. See Littlefield, supra note 115 ("Kickstarter's core user is decidedly
not from the same demographic profile as the standard equity investor."). The
originating statute does not appear to prohibit institutional investors or other
legal persons from participating in crowdfunding, but the presumption is that
the investors will be natural persons. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-116, 126 Stat. 316-18 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C.§§ 77a-77r, 78a-78o (2012)); Littlefield, supra note 115 (analyzing
Kickstarter's over 5.5 million individual contributors).
126. 157 CONG. REC. H7286 (Nov. 3, 2011) (statement by Rep. Polis). See
generally Andrew A. Schwartz, The Nonpecuniary Benefits of Crowdfunding,
34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 565 (2015) (addressing critics' concern that inves-
tors will yield negative returns through crowdfunding and enumerating the
benefits of crowdfunding).
127. 157 CONG. REC. H7287 (Nov. 3, 2011) (statement by Rep. Polis)
("[Miost of these companies aren't going to work out. That's the nature of capi-
talism. Most of them are going to go out of business. . .. But do you know
what? Some of them are going to work out. We could see the next Google, the
next Yahoo!, the next Microsoft. Many of these companies started as garage
companies, funded by proverbial friends and family. The next great American
success story can be funded by crowd[fundling. It can have thousands of inves-
tors from middle class families across the country, earning millions of dollars
on their investments . . . ."). Uber, an app-based transportation company, was
founded in 2009 and valued five years later at over $40 billion. Douglas Mac-
Millan et al., Investors Push Uber's Valuation Past $40 Billion, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 5, 2014, at Al.
128. See Hazen, supra note 11, at 1741 (noting that the registration, disclo-
sure, and reporting requirements of the 1933 and 1934 Act sought to protect
consumers).
129. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1460, 1468-70 (describing the complexities
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every reason to expect that American investors will act just as
they always have and buy into the prospect that this or that
company is the next big thing. A hint of the enthusiasm that
investors may show for crowdfunding securities has already
been seen on reward crowdfunding websites."' The immense
and growing popularity of reward crowdfunding provides
ground for optimism regarding the prospects that investors of
all types will embrace the opportunity that the JOBS Act pro-
* 132
vides.3
In short, crowdfunding is designed to, and likely will, give
rise to the phenomenon of the digital shareholder, a new, inclu-
sive and diverse class of investor that will democratize the
market for entrepreneurial financing.
II. THE THREE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF
ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE
The vision of crowdfunding just described'3 1 is a compelling
one, but the form faces significant obstacles. It is generally ac-
cepted in the literature that all methods of investing pose three
fundamental problems that must be addressed in order for the
form to function: uncertainty, information asymmetry, and
agency costs.13 4 This Part introduces this "trio of problems" 3 1
of the registration requirement under the 1933 Securities Act).
130. Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Peter I. Tsoflias, An Introduction to the
Federalist Society's Panelist Discussion Titled "Deregulating the Markets: The
Jobs Act," 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 453, 488 (2013) (calling the JOBS Act "the big-
gest deregulatory statute in the history of American securities regulation"
(quoting Professor Robert Thompson)).
131. As of July 2010, promoters on Kickstarter had raised a total of $15
million for 1600 projects. Edan Burkett, A Crowdfunding Exemption? Online
Investment Crowdfunding and U.S. Securities Regulation, 13 TRANSACTIONS:
TENN. J. Bus. L. 63, 73 (2011). Five years later, the total is more than 100
times larger. Stats, supra note 36 (reporting that $2 billion has been pledged
for more than 94,000 projects).
132. See supra note 131.
133. See supra Part I.B.
134. This tripartite analysis was first presented, at least in this crystal-
lized form, in Gilson, supra note 17 ("Absent a workable response, the extremi-
ty of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency problems likely would
raise the cost of external capital to a point of market failure."). It has since
been widely adopted by numerous other scholars. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note
17, at 48 ("VC scholarship has [long] been concerned with primarily one ques-
tion: How do VC investors respond to the extreme uncertainty, information
asymmetry, and agency problems inherent in VC investment?" (citing Gilson,
supra note 17)); Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt As Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1169, 1190 ("One of the most-discussed topics in the venture capital lit-
erature is how VCs select and monitor start-ups in the face of extreme levels of
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and explains why they will present themselves in "extreme
form" in the context of crowdfunding.'
A. UNCERTAINTY
Uncertainty is inherent in investing because the future is
unpredictable. 3 7 There is no way to know in advance which
companies will succeed and which will fail, yet the nature of in-
vesting is that one must hand over one's money based on
guesses about how the future will play out. Thus, the term un-
certainty, as used here, refers to "contingencies that none of the
parties can definitively predict (for example, the success of a
firm's research and commercialization efforts, the market's ul-
timate receptivity to a firm's product, the success of competing
research efforts, and macroeconomic and industry condi-
tions)." "
Crowdfunding is designed as a vehicle to fund startups at
their infancy, 3 which necessarily present a much greater de-
gree of uncertainty than do existing businesses.1 40 An invest-
ment in a toll bridge must be made in part on the basis of the
anticipated traffic volume, but that cannot be predicted with
certainty, making the investment uncertain. Compare the toll
bridge investment with an investment in a startup coordinating
uncertainty, information asymmetries, and agency costs." (citing Gilson, supra
note 17)); Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L.
REV. 767, 792 (2015) ("[Elvery business must address . . . uncertainty, infor-
mation asymmetry, and agency costs." (citing Gilson, supra note 17)).
135. Gilson, supra note 17.
136. See id.
137. Id. at 1076-77.
138. Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital
Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 874, 879 n.14 (2003).
139. Crowdfunding is generally available for any type of private company,
but its core goal is to advance startup companies. See supra note 5. But cf
Seth C. Oranburg, Bridgefunding Is Crowdfunding for Startups Across the
Private Equity Gap, 25 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2016) (man-
uscript at 25) (suggesting that crowdfunding would be most useful for compa-
nies that have already attracted angel investors).
140. Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regula-
tions Should Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 121 (2010)
("Because startup companies are new ventures operating outside of estab-
lished markets, investing in them involves substantial uncertainty, infor-
mation asymmetry, and agency costs."); Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation:
The Endogeneity of Technology, Organizational Structure, and Financial Con-
tracting, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 885, 901 (2010).
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"rideshares" over that bridge through smartphones.' 4 ' The lat-
ter is clearly subject to many additional levels, layers and
forms of uncertainty regarding technology, commuter ac-
ceptance, government regulation or prohibition, the outcome of
strategic decisions, and myriad other considerations.1 42
In short, uncertainty is at a height for the type of startups
that will use crowdfunding, making potential investors reticent
to invest. More formally, uncertainty raises the cost of capital
and, at the extreme, could shut off a company from financing
entirely. 1 4 3 It must be addressed for crowdfunding to function.
B. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
The idea of information asymmetry is that there is certain
information that is known to founders, promoters, managers or
other insiders, but not investors.'" Consider an investment in a
farm. Plainly the farmer knows much more about the land and
its operation-which fields have good drainage; whether the
tractor is rusty; the planting habits of her neighbors-than do
the investors. This sort of information asymmetry is exacerbat-
ed in the startup context, particularly if there is technology or
science involved.'45 Computer code, for example, is not easy to
read or review; the programmer herself will surely know her
code better than anyone on the outside looking in.
Information asymmetry can lead to a market failure due to
adverse selection, also known as the "lemons" problem, famous-
ly espoused through the example of used cars. 46 The lemons
problem is this: Potential investors are aware that company in-
siders hold important information that they (the investors) can
never truly know, and this makes it difficult to distinguish be-
tween good and bad investments. Investors can therefore be
141. See, e.g., CARMA, http://carmacarpool.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2015)
(offering a commission-based smartphone app that "enables you to find nearby
people going your way so you can share your commute ... [and] the cost of the
journey").
142. See Cable, supra note 140 (explaining that uncertainty is inherent in
startups because their innovative products and business design remain un-
tested).
143. Gilson, supra note 17.
144. Gilson & Schizer, supra note 138 ("'[Information asymmetry' refers to
circumstances in which one party knows more about a particular fact relevant
to the business than the other party does (for example, an employee or manag-
er knows more about how hard she works than the venture capitalist does).").
145. Gilson, supra note 17.
146. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488-91 (1970).
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expected to discount all investments, including the good ones.
Absent intervention, the expected effect is that all good invest-
ments will depart out of the market, leaving only bad ones."
Information asymmetry, and the lemons problem it can
cause, applies forcefully to crowdfunding.'4 1 Crowdfunding en-
trepreneurs will know much better than digital shareholders
how successful their venture is likely to be.'49 Consider the case
of a downtown caf6. The founder knows how many other cafes
already exist in the neighborhood, the going price for a cappuc-
cino, how hard she plans to work, and a thousand other things
unknown to potential investors. All this represents information
asymmetry.
Furthermore, because promising entrepreneurs can be ex-
pected to have alternative avenues for financing, some com-
mentators predict that those with good prospects will prefer
other financing sources (such as angel investors and VCs), leav-
ing crowdfunding investors with the leftovers.'5 o To some ex-
tent, this critique can be countered by the fact that an entre-
preneur need not necessarily choose between crowdfunding and
the alternatives."' But this is not a complete answer, and the
lemons problem is a real one for crowdfunding.152
147. Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for
Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 784 (2001) (explaining that
information asymmetry and adverse selection can combine to drive most of the
honest share-issuers out of securities markets); Frank H. Easterbrook & Dan-
iel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L.
REV. 669, 673-76 (1984) (discussing the "lemons" problem in securities mar-
kets and proposing potential solutions).
148. Tomboc, supra note 14, at 266; id. at 267 ("[Olnline investors face
greater uncertainty than investors in offline brick and mortar businesses.").
149. See id. at 266.
150. E.g., Dorff supra note 14, at 497 ("[Ilt seems unlikely that any busi-
ness that could obtain angel investments would seek out crowdfunding in-
stead. Crowdfunding is therefore likely to attract those businesses that are
least likely to succeed."); id. at 517 ("[Elquity crowdfunders will have available
to them only those opportunities already rejected by more sophisticated inves-
tors.").
151. This has already occurred in an analogous space: SCiO, a startup
making a small and affordable molecular sensor, raised $2.7 million through
reward crowdfunding and millions more through accredited-only investing.
Zack Miller, Don't Believe These 4 Myths About Equity Crowdfunding, OUR
CROWD (Dec. 3, 2014), http-//blog.ourcrowd.com/index.php/2014/12/03/dont
-believe-these-4-myths-about-equity-crowdfinding; SCiO: Your Sixth Sense: A
Pocket Molecular Sensor for All!, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter
.com/projects/903107259/scio-your-sixth-sense-a-pocket-molecular-sensor-fo
(last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
152. See Ibrahim, supra note 14, at 591-603 (identifying the potential for a
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To summarize, crowdfunded startups present a great deal
of information asymmetry. If this issue is not sufficiently ad-
dressed, digital shareholders will refuse to invest and the mar-
ket will not function.
C. AGENCY COSTS
An "agency" relationship is one in which one party, the
"principal," hires another party, the "agent," to perform some
service for the benefit of the principal. 3 Agency relationships
can be tremendously valuable, for instance when an agent has
specialized knowledge and training." All agency relationships,
however, suffer from a fundamental downside, namely that the
agent's position allows her to act in her own interest as opposed
to that of the principal."' This divergence of interests is formal-
ly known as "agency costs." 1 5 6
Agency costs have been known since at least the age of Ad-
am Smith"7 and are a "pervasive fact of economic life."" Con-
sider the following examples of agent misbehavior familiar
from lived experience: an employee spends her time surfing the
Internet rather than advancing the company's interest;'5 ' a bar-
tender provides drinks for cash and pockets the proceeds;160 an
investment bank's advice is tainted by personal interest.161
"lemons" problem as a result of crowdfunding); Tomboc, supra note 14, at 266
(explaining the "lemons" problem in crowdfunding).
153. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Mana-
gerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305,
308 (1976).
154. Consider the case of a surgeon who acts as the agent for the patient-
principal, providing services the patient obviously could not perform on her-
self.
155. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 153.
156. Id.
157. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 700 (Edwin Cannan ed.,
Modem Library 1937) (1776) ("[M]anagers . . . of other people's money . . .
cannot well be expected [to] watch over it with the same anxious vigilance
with which ... [people] watch over their own.").
158. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND
AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
159. PETER T. LEESON, THE INVISIBLE HOOK 38 (2009).
160. Don't Let Your Bartenders Rob You Blind!, BOB JOHNSON'S SCHOOL OF
BAR MGMT., http./www.bobthebarguy.comlbme.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
161. E.g., In re El Paso Corp. S'holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 434, 440, 442
(Del. Ch. 2012) (finding that Goldman Sachs, serving as advisor (agent) to El
Paso in its sale to Kinder Morgan, had a "bias toward a suboptimally priced
deal with Kinder Morgan" because it owned "approximately 19%, or $4 billion
worth, of Kinder Morgan stock," and because "the lead Goldman banker work-
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Most important for present purposes, agency cost theory
has played a dominant role in understanding business organi-
zations, including both public companies 6 2 and private
startups.1 6 3 The investors, as the "owners" of the corporation,
are seen as the principals. The top corporate managers are the
agents of the investors, running the company for the latter's
benefit.'" This analogy is imperfect,6 5 but it has served as a
useful model for almost a century, since the path-breaking
work of Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means.6
Their 1932 book, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, argued that the dispersed nature of public sharehold-
ers "produces a condition where the interests of owner and of
ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge.""' This "separa-
tion of ownership and control" identified by Berle and Means
was formalized and rechristened in the 1970s as "agency costs"
by Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling.'6 8 Golf cours-
es, 6 9 sculpture gardens,o and corporate jets"' are seen by some
ing for El Paso . . . personally owned approximately $340,000 of Kinder Mor-
gan stock"); cf. id. at 434 ("Although Goldman's conflict was known, inade-
quate efforts to cabin its role were made . . .").
162. WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LE-
GAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 178 (11th ed. 2010) (explaining the dynamic
between shareholder-agents and corporate manager-principals); George S.
Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 955, 976 (2007).
163. Bartlett, supra note 17, at 51 ("[Tlhe influence of agency cost theory is
clearly evident in virtually any discussion of VC investment.").
164. Geis, supra note 162; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 153, at 309
("[Tihe relationship between the stockholders and manager of a corporation fit
the definition of a pure agency relationship.").
165. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011
UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1672 ("[M]ost scholars would probably agree that share-
holders are not really 'owners' in the traditional sense . . . ." (collecting author-
ities)); see also Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS, supra note 158, at 56
("To an experienced corporate lawyer. . . the assertion that corporate manag-
ers are agents of investors, whether debtholders or stockholders, will seem odd
or loose.").
166. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); see Bartlett, supra note 17, at 50 (stating
that agency cost analysis is "the primary analytical framework used in con-
temporary corporate scholarship").
167. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 166, at 6.
168. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 153, at 327.
169. See, e.g., Jacob Bunge, DuPont Holds onto Rare Assets, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 23, 2014, at B10.
170. See, e.g., Rachel A. Antman, Modern Sculptures, Outdoors and Free,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2006, at F7 (describing the Donald M. Kendall Sculpture
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as expressions of the agency costs present in the traditional
public company. As for private companies funded by VCs, the
agency costs look somewhat different on the surface, but the
basic problem is the same.'7 2 Management, being human, will
be constantly tempted to put their own interests ahead of those
of their investors.
Once crowdfunding goes live, and people across the country
invest in companies via online portals, the management of the-
se companies will assume the position of agents, and the digital
shareholders will act as principals. This will surely lead to the
same sort of agency costs we have long observed in other con-
texts. Moreover, each investor will likely have a small amount
at stake, thanks to the annual cap, akin to the traditional
Berle-Means public corporation with dispersed shareholders.7 3
Management will be in control of the company on a day-to-day
basis, 7 4 and would seem to be just as prone to shirking, steal-
ing, and generally acting against the investors' interest as any
other agent would be.
In other words, crowdfunded company managers are in an
analogous position to public company managers vis-A-vis their
shareholders. They will be managing "other people's money,",7 5
and the usual agency costs will be present in the crowdfunding
context as well. For example, if a rock band were to crowdfund
securities that promise investors a portion of the profits from
an upcoming tour, the investors are analogous to principals and
the band is analogous to their agent. It is easy to imagine the
band taking limousines to their shows, enjoying lovely buffets
backstage, and throwing great after-parties-even though the-
se perks will cut into the investors' profit.
Dealing with agency costs like these in the crowdfunding
context is in the interest of all parties. For investors, the reason
is obvious: they want the founders, promoters, and managers to
do a good and faithful job running the company. As for promot-
ers, they realize that no one will invest in the company (or will
only do so at a high cost of capital) unless they can assure po-
tential investors that agency costs will be sufficiently cab-
Gardens at PepsiCo's headquarters in Purchase, New York).
171. See, e.g., Joann S. Lublin, The Annual CEO Pay Survey: Firms Still
Pay for Personal Jet Use, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2014, at B5.
172. Gilson, supra note 17, at 1077.
173. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 166, at 47-68.
174. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2015).
175. SMITH, supra note 157.
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ined."' Agency costs must be addressed for crowdfunding to
function.
This Part showed that erecting the legislative apparatus
for crowdfunding is not enough to ensure that it will actually
work. Crowdfunding must somehow solve the three fundamen-
tal problems of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agen-
cy costs, or be doomed to failure.
The next two Parts take up this challenge. Part III will ex-
amine other related contexts where these three problems have
been resolved, namely venture capital, angel investing, and
public companies. The goal of Part III is to determine whether
the techniques employed in those traditional forms of entrepre-
neurial finance for addressing the trio of problems would be
appropriate for crowdfunding. Finally, Part IV will introduce a
set of new and different responses specifically designed for
crowdfunding.
III. MOST TRADITIONAL TECHNIQUES WILL NOT
TRANSLATE TO CROWDFUNDING
The three fundamental problems of entrepreneurial fi-
nance-uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency
costs-are not new to crowdfunding. To the contrary, they have
long been known by the traditional sources of American entre-
preneurial finance: venture capitalists, angel investors, and
public shareholders. More importantly, each has responded to
the trio of problems with methods that suit their particular in-
stitutional context.
Rather than reinventing the wheel, it makes sense to ask
first whether any of these techniques are appropriate for use in
crowdfunding. Unfortunately, as this Part will show, none of
the important and effective methods for addressing the trio of
problems that have been developed by VCs, angels, or public
investors will be of much use for crowdfunding.
In a way, this should come as no surprise, as the economic
circumstances are divergent. Public companies are raising
hundreds of millions of dollars, VCs invest tens of millions of
dollars, and even angel investments are generally over $1 mil-
lion. All crowdfunding rounds, by contrast, will be under $1
million, per the statute."' The mechanisms that make sense for
176. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 153, at 309.
177. Indeed, they may be under $500,000 to avoid the cost of audited finan-
cial statements. See supra note 57.
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raising many millions of dollars will understandably differ from
those that make sense in the $100,OOs.178
This Part will review the key methods that VCs, angels,
and public companies use to respond to the three problems of
entrepreneurial finance and explain why those solutions will
mostly not translate well to crowdfunding.
A. SOLUTIONS FROM VENTURE CAPITAL
Venture capitalists invest in high-risk, high-growth
startup companies at an early stage of their development, 79
when the trio of problems present themselves in "extreme
form.",8 o Uncertainty as to how the startup will perform is
greatly magnified because it is in such an early stage. Many fu-
ture decisions will have to be made by management, and the
outcome of those decisions, and the effort expended, are highly
uncertain.18 1 If the business has a technological component, this
adds scientific uncertainty.18 2 Information asymmetries be-
tween VCs and founders are also a major problem because the
entrepreneur's "intentions and abilities" are known to her but
not the VC.'1' Finally, agency costs are potentially quite signifi-
cant for VCs,18 4 in part because the entrepreneur's interests can
"sharply diverge from those of the venture capital investors,
especially with respect to the risk level and duration of the in-
vestment." 8 '
The American VC market has succeeded in the face of all
these obstacles, funding such notable successes as Googlel86 and
Facebook. '8 7 VCs have created and honed methods and tech-
178. Part IV will introduce a set of new methods that are particularly suit-
ed to the crowdfunding context.
179. See generally PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL
CYCLE (2d ed. 2004).
180. See Gilson, supra note 17.
181. See id. at 1077.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See Bartlett, supra note 17, at 40.
185. Gilson, supra note 17, at 1077.
186. Bartlett, supra note 17, at 38 ("In 1999, two venture capital (VC) firms
invested $25 million in a newly formed Internet search firm called Google.
Four years later, after Google's initial public offering (IPO), their investment
was worth over $4 billion.").
187. Ari Levy, Accel Facebook Bet Poised To Become Biggest Venture Profit:
Tech, BLOOMBERG Bus. (Jan. 17, 2012, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2012-01-18/accel-s-facebook-bet-poised-to-become-biggest
-ever-venture-profit-tech (reporting that venture capital fund Accel Partners
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niques to address the trio of problems that make sense in this
distinctive institutional context. The core of the VC solution is
the syndicated and geographically concentrated use of compre-
hensive investment contracts that "allow venture capitalists to
screen, monitor, and control their investments" through a com-
bination of staged financing, convertible preferred shares, con-
trol rights, and equity-based compensation. 8 1
Can these mechanisms be borrowed by crowdfunding? As
will appear, most of the key methods used by VCs are inappro-
priate for crowdfunding.
1. Staged Financing
Instead of conveying their entire investment to a startup
all at once, VCs stage their financing by divvying the money up
over time, and conditioning the payouts on achieving designat-
ed milestones projected by management. '8 Staged financing is
a highly potent method of addressing the three problems of en-
trepreneurial finance.9 o It reduces information asymmetry by
making entrepreneurs "less likely to exaggerate a company's
prospects in negotiating with a VC investor,""' and it reduces
agency costs by providing "a powerful incentive for managers to
meet designated milestones in order to receive future financ-
ing."1 92 Can staged financing be used in crowdfunding? As will
appear, a form of staged financing may indeed be relevant to
the crowdfunding context, but likely only rarely.
Formal staged financing will likely not play much of a role
in crowdfunding. In theory, a crowdfunding intermediary could
collect money from the crowd, and then dole it out to an issuer
over time, contingent on hitting agreed-upon benchmarks. This
idea has merit in the crowdfunding context, for all the same
reasons it does in the VC world, but it is not clearly allowed
under the JOBS Act. That statute directs crowdfunding inter-
mediaries to convey the offering proceeds to the issuer once it
made a $12.2 million investment in Facebook in 2005 that had grown to be
worth $10 billion in 2012).
188. Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior ofAngel Investors,
61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1407 (2008).
189. D. Gordon Smith, Team Production in Venture Capital Investing, 24 J.
CORP. L. 949, 952 (1999).
190. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 179, at 171 ("Staged capital infusions
are the most potent control mechanism a venture capitalist can employ.");
Bartlett, supra note 17, at 54.
191. Bartlett, supra note 17, at 52.
192. Id.; see also Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1413.
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reaches its goal.193 The intermediary is not clearly authorized to
hold back a portion of the funds.
An informal type of staged financing may nevertheless be
used in the crowdfunding context, whereby crowdfunding com-
panies return to the crowd for financing year after year. A com-
pany could, for instance, seek to crowdfund $1 million per year
for several years, and would promise the crowd that it would
hit certain annual benchmarks. If it fails to meet the bench-
marks in a given year, it will surely find it difficult to convince
the crowd to fund it for the next year. This places pressure on
the management to meet the benchmarks, thereby ameliorat-
ing the trio of problems.
The pressure on management will likely be much less in-
tense than in the VC context because the consequences of miss-
ing a set of benchmarks is much lower for crowdfunding man-
agers. In traditional VC staged financing, a legal promise of
future funding is conditioned on meeting the benchmarks. In
this type of informal staged financing for crowdfunding, by con-
trast, each year's fundraising would be legally independent
from every other. Hitting the benchmarks in one year will
merely raise the chances of successfully raising money next
year; it does not oblige the crowd to continue financing the
company. Thus the disciplining effect of staged financing, so
powerful in the VC context, will be more moderate in the world
of crowdfunding.
In addition, it is unclear how many companies will engage
in crowdfunding year after year. On the one hand, if the com-
pany goes out of business-a likely outcome for many
crowdfunded startups-then it will never return to the crowd.
On the other hand, if the company succeeds, it may be able to
meet its own financing needs from profits, or will have other
sources of financing, such as bank loans. Only those companies
that have neither crashed nor outgrown the crowd will return
repeatedly. How many will fit that bill is hard to predict.
In conclusion, informal staged financing holds some prom-
ise for at least some crowdfunding companies.
193. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(7) (2012) (stating that intermediaries must
"ensure that all offering proceeds are only provided to the issuer" once it
reaches its goal).
194. Nor is the intermediary clearly prohibited from doing so.
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2. Preferred Stock
Most VC investments are in preferred stock,'9 ' which is a
security that gives the holder (the VC investor) various prefer-
ential economic rights, including most notably a "liquidation
preference" that would come into play in the event of the com-
pany's liquidation or sale. 9 6 Preferred stock is generally con-
vertible to common stock at the election of the holder, and if the
preferred stock has "participation" rights, its holders may re-
ceive the preferred liquidation preference plus convert the pre-
ferred stock to common stock, thereby also "participating" in
the residual profits of the liquidated firm."'
VCs are understood to use preferred stock to reduce infor-
mation asymmetry and agency costs. The ex ante liquidation
preference of preferred stock serves a signaling function that
helps investors identify promising entrepreneurs-information
that is otherwise asymmetrically known. An entrepreneur who
believes that the company will be worth more than the liquida-
tion preference would be willing to grant such a preference to
an investor; an entrepreneur without such confidence would
not."' And as for the latter, the preferential rights held by the
VC create an incentive for management to meet their financial
projections.!
Crowdfunding will not likely make much use of preferred
stock because the cost of negotiating the liquidation preference,
participation rights and dozens of other attributes is not feasi-
ble in this context. Preferred stock is a complex instrument
with technical terms that are actively negotiated among VCs
and entrepreneurs using expert counsel. 00 But one of the foun-
dational purposes of crowdfunding is to be a simple securities
market that poses extremely low costs of raising capital and is
therefore accessible to a wide swath of early-stage entrepre-
195. Gilson & Schizer, supra note 138, at 875.
196. Bartlett, supra note 17, at 54. Other common rights include preferen-
tial dividend rights, redemption rights and antidilution protection. Id.
197. Id. The total value of preferred stock is equal to the liquidation prefer-
ence plus the expected value of any participation right. The liquidation prefer-
ence is much more easily observable because it is declared in the company's
charter and the VC's stock purchase agreement, whereas the expected liquida-
tion value of common stock upon a trade sale is highly speculative.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 55.
200. Wroldsen, supra note 13, at 633 n.239 (describing some of the key
points of negotiation).
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neurs.20 Bespoke contract drafting by an attorney, especially
an expert, will be far too costly for most crowdfunding ven-
tures. 2 Even if it were affordable, there will be no one on the
investor side to ask for convertible preferred stock or negotiate
its provisions.
Second, preferred stock is generally convertible to common
stock at the option of the holder, so the problems that go with
equity would apply here too. As I have discussed elsewhere,
there are good reasons for startups to avoid selling common
stock through crowdfunding.20 s The sale of equity exposes
founders to personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty and
empowers shareholders with the right to vote, demand books
and records, and otherwise distracts management.20 4 For these
reasons too, crowdfunding entrepreneurs are likely to sell some
security other than convertible preferred stock.
In short, preferred stock, though quite useful in the VC
context, is not appropriate for use in crowdfunding.
3. Control Rights
As a mechanism for addressing agency costs, VCs routinely
demand that they be granted certain powers of control, includ-
ing a seat on the board of directors and negative covenants giv-
ing the VC the power to veto important corporate actions.205
These methods will not translate to crowdfunding.
A seat on the board of directors must be occupied by a sin-
gle natural person, not a crowd.2 06 A VC fund manager may
take the position herself or can easily designate such a person,
but the coordination costs of having a crowd of digital share-
holders select a representative are likely too high to make it
worthwhile. And even if the crowd were able to do so, entrepre-
201. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1466-73; supra Part I.B.1.
202. Cf Wroldsen, supra note 13, at 626.
203. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1483-87.
204. See id.
205. See Bartlett, supra note 17, at 53.
206. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2015). But cf Stephen M. Bain-
bridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate
Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (2014) ("posit[ing] a novel alternative" to
the rule that directors must be natural persons, namely that "board services
could be provided by other entities, be they partnerships, corporations, limited
liability corporations, or any other type of business association"). Were Bain-
bridge and Henderson's proposal to be adopted, crowdfunded companies could
make good use of such "board service providers." Id. At this time, however,
this remains a theoretical idea that has not been approved by any legislature.
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neurs are unlikely to be interested. It is one thing to give a
board seat to a VC fund manager whom the entrepreneur has
come to know personally and gets along with. But it is quite
another to simply take whomever the crowd selects. A VC's
nominee is likely to have expertise and provide a benefit to the
company, but this seems much less likely in the crowdfunding
context.
As for negative covenants, most entrepreneurs will be un-
willing to yield control to the crowd in this way for many of the
same reasons that they will likely sell only a minority voting
interest to the crowd.207 It may be reasonable to put the future
of one's startup in the hands of an experienced VC fund man-
ager in exchange for millions of dollars of financing. By con-
trast, it is hard to imagine an entrepreneur allowing the crowd
to control the startup's destiny for sums under $1 million.208
In summary, control rights of the sort used by VCs to ad-
dress agency costs will play no role in crowdfunding.
4. Equity-Based Compensation
Corporate managers can be compensated in a manner that
addresses the fundamental problem of agency costs. One im-
portant method used by VCs is to pay management primarily
in company stock, thereby making them into shareholders
themselves.2 09 Compensating managers with common stock,
and requiring them to hold it for some time, aligns the interests
of the management with those of the VC investors in order to
ameliorate agency costs. 2 1 0
Equity-based compensation of this sort is among the weak-
er mechanisms used by VCs. Moreover, it will not be relevant
for at least a large swath of crowdfunding companies. First,
there is good reason to expect that most crowdfunding entre-
preneurs will retain all or a majority of the equity in the com-
pany and sell debt or other securities to the crowd.211 Where a
207. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1481-82.
208. One million dollars is the most a company is allowed to raise via
crowdfunding in a year. See supra note 50.
209. See Bartlett, supra note 17, at 53. See generally, e.g., LUCIAN
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004).
210. See Bartlett, supra note 17, at 53.
211. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1459-77 (predicting that most
crowdfunding entrepreneurs will sell debt or other non-equity securities to the
crowd); see also Joan MacLeod Heminway, What Is a Security in the
Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREP. Bus. L.J. 335, 360-61 (2012) (sug-
gesting the use of "unequity," "a particular type of financial interest that pro-
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founder holds most of the equity, she is already incentivized to
work hard for the company; ladling on even more would not
seem to be worth the candle.212 Second, the design of an equity-
based compensation package is a complex and nuanced task.
While it may make sense for sophisticated and experienced VCs
to negotiate with an entrepreneur to develop a sensible equity-
based compensation package, it is likely an inappropriate tool
for digital shareholders to employ.
For these reasons, equity-based compensation will likely
play a relatively small role in addressing agency costs at
crowdfunded companies.
5. Geographic Proximity
A final way in which VC firms respond to uncertainty, in-
formation asymmetry, and agency costs is by keeping their in-
vestments close to home. 213 The industry is "remarkably local-
ized , with Silicon Valley VCs investing in companies based
in Northern California and New York VCs investing on the
East Coast.21 5 This geographic concentration by VCs2 1 6 is an im-
portant method of addressing uncertainty and information
asymmetry by enhancing the ability of the VC to conduct due
diligence.217 Information asymmetry is further reduced by the
reputation market that works well in a local community. 218 Fi-
nally, geographic concentration enhances monitoring and thus
helps address agency costs. 2 1 9
Geographic concentration will not be a terribly useful tech-
nique for crowdfunding to address the trio of problems.220 Pre
liminarily, digital shareholders will come from every part of the
country and will be allowed to invest anywhere they wish.22 '
vides for profit-sharing or revenue-sharing on a short-term basis, with no ac-
companying governance rights").
212. The same is true if the entrepreneur holds a majority of the equity,
though to a lesser extent.
213. See Gilson, supra note 17, at 1087.
214. Id.
215. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 286-87; see FLORIDA, supra note 97 (noting
that VC investments are concentrated in particular regions).
216. And angel investors, as discussed infra Part III.B.3.
217. Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 717, 730 (2010).
218. Gilson, supra note 17, at 1087.
219. See Ibrahim, supra note 217.
220. See Schwartz, supra note 5. For intrastate crowdfunding, the design is
for a state-wide market.
221. See supra Part I.B.2.
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Many will surely spread their investments from coast-to-coast,
as they do in reward crowdfunding.2 22 Be that as it may, at least
some digital shareholders are likely to focus on companies local
to their domicile. There may be such a group, as the vibrancy of
the "eat local" movement demonstrates.2 2 Indeed, the SEC's
Regulation Crowdfunding specifically authorizes portals to fo-
cus on a certain geographic area.2
Yet even for these sorts of digital shareholders who focus
on a certain city or region, the reasons why VC investors use
this method do not apply to them: digital shareholders will not
do much, if any, physical due diligence,225 will not sit on boards
of directors, and generally will not be able to monitor the way
that VCs do, even if they live close by.22 ' Even assuming that
some local investors may be familiar with neighborhoods and
local needs (e.g., they know that a certain block already has
three coffee shops), this effect is quite modest compared with
the benefits that VCs obtain from geographic proximity in
terms of reducing uncertainty, information asymmetry and
agency costs.
In short, geographic concentration will not translate well
from the VC to the crowdfunding context.
B. SOLUTIONS FROM ANGEL INVESTING
Angel investors are wealthy individuals who finance
startups with their own funds at a very early stage of their de-
velopment, even earlier than VCs. 2 2 ' The nature of such in-
vestments is that they present extremely high levels of uncer-
tainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs. These three
222. See Ajay K. Agrawal et al., The Geography of Crowdfunding 1 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16820, 2011) ("The geographic
dispersion of investment evident in our data implies that [reward]
crowdfunding ... largely overcomes the distance-related economic frictions
usually associated with financing entrepreneurial ventures.").
223. See, e.g., JEFF KAGAN & PAIGE DOUGHTY, Eat Local, on 21ST CENTURY
ENERGY SUPERHEROES (2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
ihULIlqnelE (children's song encouraging them to "eat local").
224. A portal may limit listings to those from a certain geographic location.
See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,560 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (notice
of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 227.402(b)(2)(ii)).
225. Cf infra text accompanying note 454 (indicating that Google Maps
"Street View" can be used as a partial substitute for physical due diligence).
226. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
227. See infra Part III.C.5.
228. See Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1406.
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problems present themselves in much the same way as in VC, 22
but in an even more severe form because angels invest in
startups at an earlier stage.230
One might expect angels to follow the lead of VCs and em-
ploy the various techniques just described to address uncer-
tainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs. 3 ' It turns
out, however, that angel investors utilize a different set of solu-
tions that suit their distinctive institutional context.3  Angels
eschew the comprehensive, detailed, and powerful investment
contracts used by VCs, instead opting for simple contracts with
few formal investor protections. 3 According to the literature,
angels rely primarily on technical expertise, geographic proxim-
ity, and active participation to address uncertainty, infor-
mation asymmetry, and agency costs. 3 4 This Section examines
these methods of responding to the trio of problems and their
potential application to crowdfunding. Crowdfunding presents
a completely different institutional context than that of tradi-
tional angel investing, and the techniques used by angels will
not translate directly to crowdfunding.
1. Technical Expertise
Angel investors generally invest in areas in which they
have technical expertise.235 Many angels are themselves ex-
entrepreneurs who focus their investments on the industry that
they know and previously succeeded in.2" Technical expertise
has proved to be a powerful method of addressing all three fun-
damental problems of investing. The angel's expertise "reduces
uncertainty by allowing the angel to better gauge the start-up's
chances for success" and it "reduces information asymmetry by
minimizing the entrepreneur's advantage of private infor-
mation."237 It also responds to agency costs by enhancing the
ability of the angel to thoughtfully monitor management's
231technical progress.
229. See supra Part III.A.
230. See Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1420.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 1422-24.
233. See id. at 1422.
234. For an example of such literature, see Ibrahim, supra note 188.
235. See Fisch, supra note 29, at 86; Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1431-32.
236. See Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1419.
237. Id. at 1431-32.
238. See id. at 1431 (discussing how the relationship between angels and
entrepreneurs reduces agency costs).
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This method of addressing the trio of problems has little
direct relevance for crowdfunding. Digital shareholders will be
ordinary people from all walks of life.' Compared to wealthy
financiers and engineers from the likes of MIT and Stanford,2 40
lay people are much less able to employ expertise as a tool to
respond to the trio of problems. This idea of technical expertise
thus does not directly apply to crowdfunding. However, if we
take the concept of expertise broadly, it may hold some prom-
ise.
As Nobel Prize winner Friedrich Hayek famously taught,
everyone from every background does indeed have expertise-
"expertise" in the sense of knowing something valuable that is
not generally known.24 1 Science is "not the sum of all
knowledge," wrote Hayek.242 Rather, there is another body of
"very important but unorganized knowledge": the dispersed bits
of information that each person happens to know because of
their unique experience, skills, and perspective, what Hayek
called "the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time
and place."2 4 Thanks to this sort of expertise, every individual
"has some advantage over all others because he possesses
unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but
of which use can be made only if the decisions depending on it
are left to him or are made with his active cooperation."244
Hayek's ideas describe crowdfunding well. Various digital
shareholders will hold different bits of useful information relat-
ing to crowdfunding companies, and they can choose to make
beneficial use of that information. 2 45 For example, avid video
gamers are familiar with what makes a good game and other
aspects of the business in a way that few others could match.246
Thus a video game aficionado may focus all her crowdfunding
investments on video games. She would reduce uncertainty and
239. See supra Part I.B.2.
240. See Ibrahim, supra note 217, at 729.
241. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519
(1945).
242. Id. at 521.
243. Id. at 521-22 (referring to the same idea as "knowledge of people, of
local conditions, and of special circumstances").
244. Id.
245. See Dorff, supra note 14 (stating that crowdfunders can use their rele-
vant personal experiences to invest).
246. Cf Ibrahim, supra note 14, at 597 (explaining why a group of video
game players would be better able to predict a video game's success than VC
investors).
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information asymmetry by sticking to her area of expertise
(video games) and would be able to monitor the progress of the
business in a thoughtful way. For example, she could volunteer
to be an early beta-tester of the game and, after playing it for a
few days, understand deeply how it stacks up against the com-
petition on numerous dimensions.
Other examples can be given: fitness instructors can spot a
promising exercise machine; home cooks know what small ap-
pliances might succeed. None of these types of knowledge can
really be called technical expertise, but the point is that they
can nevertheless be used by digital shareholders in a manner
247
akin to the use of technical expertise by angel investors.
To summarize, technical expertise as used by angel inves-
tors is not directly applicable to crowdfunding. Expertise broad-
ly construed in the Hayekian sense, however, is indeed an ap-
propriate method for digital shareholders to employ.
2. Active Participation
After angels make their investments, they "actively partic-
ipate" in the business.2 4 8 They make "regular visits to the start-
up's facilities," and advise management.2 19 This sort of active
participation in the day-to-day operation of the company is
highly analogous to the VC practice of taking a seat on the
board of directors, just less formal.25 0 It allows for close monitor-
ing of management and is a key method of reducing agency
costs for angel investors. 2 51 To put it simply: it's hard to slack
off when a large investor is present in the room.
Active participation in the business is clearly inappropriate
for crowdfunding.2 5 2 Digital shareholders will be passive inves-
tors-more like public shareholders than angels. Each will
have a small stake , making it economically irrational for any
one of them to put time and effort into helping run the busi-
ness. More importantly, it is hard to imagine that entrepre-
neurs will even allow digital shareholders to physically come
247. These forms of expertise can also be shared with the crowd through
crowdfunded investment analysis. See infra Part IV.B.
248. Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1433.
249. Id.
250. See supra Part III.A.3.
251. See Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1433.
252. See Dorff, supra note 14, at 515.
253. See id.
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down to the office. Unlike an experienced angel investor,254 the
crowd would not be helpful in close quarters.
In short, active participation will not translate to
crowdfunding.
3. Geographic Proximity
Because of the active participation that angels practice,
and because the opportunities they pursue are based on per-
sonal connections, angel investing is a highly localized endeav-
or, even more than VC.255 "Angel groups commonly have 'local'
names, like the 'Pasadena Angels' or the 'New York Angels,'
and they tend to invest" exclusively in local startups.2 6
257But just as in the VC context, geographic proximity will
likely not be a particularly important method for addressing
the trio of problems as they will arise in crowdfunding. Digital
shareholders will not find opportunities from personal connec-
tions; opportunities will be presented on Internet portals.255
And digital shareholders will not actively participate in the
business, as just discussed.259 There may be some role for local
knowledge, as discussed in Part III.A.5 above, but for the most
part, geographic proximity will not be appropriate for
crowdfunding.
C. SOLUTIONS FROM PUBLIC COMPANIES
The most traditional form of entrepreneurial finance is
when a company "goes public" in an initial public offering
(IPO). 2 6 0 Examples of recent IPO firms include camera-maker
GoPro, video game producer King Digital Entertainment (best
known for Candy Crush Saga), and restaurant chain Noodles &
Company. Public companies are generally more mature than
those funded by angels or VCs, but they typically are still in an
early stage of their growth, with an average age of about five to
ten years.261 Thus just like in the VC and angel context, public
254. See Cable, supra note 140, at 116.
255. See id.; Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1432.
256. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 286-87.
257. See supra Part III.A.5.
258. Other types of investors benefit from "network[s] of trust." Ibrahim,
supra note 188, at 1432.
259. See supra Part III.B.2.
260. See generally Andrew A. Schwartz, Corporate Legacy, 5 HARV. Bus. L.
REV. 237, 245 (2015) (describing the IPO process).
261. See IPO TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REBUILDING THE
IPO ON-RAMP: PUTTING EMERGING COMPANIES AND THE JOB MARKET BACK
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companies have had to respond to the three fundamental prob-
lems of entrepreneurial finance: uncertainty, information
asymmetry, and agency costs.
Agency costs are the primary problem for public companies
to overcome.262 Uncertainty and information asymmetry are
somewhat less problematic because such companies generally
have years of operating history for investors to review.263 Thus,
most of the important techniques used by public companies are
aimed specifically at addressing agency costs.
The solutions that have been adopted in the public compa-
ny context differ radically from those used by VCs and angels. 264
The key mechanisms, in roughly the order of importance, are
mandatory disclosure, takeovers, derivative actions, activist
shareholders, equity-based compensation, proxy contests, and
appraisal. As in the previous two Sections, these methods gen-
erally hold very little relevance for crowdfunding.
1. Mandatory Disclosure
At the time of an IPO, the issuing company is legally re-
quired under the '33 Act to provide full and clear disclosure
about the company and the potential risks and rewards of in-
vesting in the securities.265 Once the securities begin trading on
a secondary market, the '34 Act requires the issuing company
to provide the public with ongoing, regular, and event-based
disclosures.266 Mandatory disclosure addresses both information
asymmetry and agency costs in public companies. The insiders
who know lots of information about the company must share
that information with the public, thus reducing information
asymmetry.67 And publishing important corporate information
ON THE ROAD TO GROWTH 6(2011).
262. See generally Geis, supra note 162, at 973-82 (engaging in a compre-
hensive discussion of agency costs as a problem for public companies).
263. Uncertainty and information asymmetry are still quite significant in
the context of public companies. See Black, supra note 147, at 786 ("[A] com-
pany's shares, when the company first goes public, are like an unobservable
car, produced by an unknown manufacturer, on which investors can obtain
only dry, written information that they can't directly verify.").
264. See supra Parts III.A, III.B.
265. See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2012); id. § 77f. See generally THOMAS L. HAZEN,
THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 110-59 (Thomson West 5th ed. 2006).
266. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and
Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418 (2003).
267. See id.; see also JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL
STREET 70 (Northeastern Univ. Press rev. ed. 1995) (claiming the primary
function of the Securities Act of 1933 is to address information asymmetry).
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on the Internet (and before the Internet, on paper) lowers the
cost of monitoring for all shareholders and empowers them to
protect themselves against harmful agency costs. 2 68
The signature move of the JOBS Act, however, is to exempt
crowdfunded securities from that traditional system of manda-
tory disclosure (in order to lower transaction costs for issu-
ers). 2 6 9 Furthermore, traditional public companies must report
to investors at least quarterly, while crowdfunding companies
need only provide a single, simple annual report.270 Hence, the
traditional method of addressing information asymmetry and
agency costs through mandatory disclosure will not directly ap-
ply to crowdfunding.
Even so, there do remain some potentially significant dis-
closure obligations in the CROWDFUND Act. 2 7 ' The issuer
must file with the SEC, and make available to the relevant
funding portal and potential investors, a disclosure document
consisting of information about the business, its financial situa-
tion, and the offering.2 2 Beyond the initial sale of securities, the
CROWDFUND Act creates a duty to provide investors and the
SEC an annual report of a similar level as the original filing.273
It is hard to say in advance how lengthy and detailed the
crowdfunding disclosures will be, 2 7 4 but one thing is certain:
they will be only a tiny fraction as lengthy or detailed as the
disclosures found in the contemporary public company con-
text.27 5 Crowdfunding disclosures will probably be short and
268. See Paredes, supra note 266.
269. For a more thorough discussion of the JOBS Act's effects on mandato-
ry disclosure see Berdej6, supra note 92, at 22-32.
270. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(4).
271. Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 12 (describing the
CROWDFUND Act as imposing "a quite heavy and costly set of responsibili-
ties on both issuers and any intermediaries").
272. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1).
273. Id. § 77d-1(b)(4).
274. Cf Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,540 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013)
(notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,
227, 232, 239-40, 249) (estimating that the "burden to prepare and file" a
crowdfunding issuer disclosure form would be approximately 60 hours).
275. It is also an open question whether digital shareholders will read or
understand these disclosures, in part because they will likely be investing only
a small amount of money in each company, rendering it irrational to spend
significant time and effort learning about each one. See generally OMRI BEN-
SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED To KNow: THE
FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 6 (2014) ("Mandated disclosure is allur-
ing, but it routinely fails to achieve its ambitious goals."); Florencia Marotta-
Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of
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non-specific, and the crowd is likely to find as much infor-
mation among themselves,276 or through their collective re-
search,277 as will be disclosed by the companies.
For these reasons, mandatory disclosure will not be highly
relevant to addressing the trio of problems for crowdfunding.
2. Proxy Contests
Proxy contests address agency costs in public companies as
the possibility of being voted out by the shareholders helps
keep the board accountable in a manner akin to politicians.
Such elections are often routine affairs, where the outgoing
board nominates itself for another term and the shareholders
approve, but sometimes an insurgent group challenges the in-
cumbent board to a contested election (a proxy contest)27 8 where
the shareholders ultimately decide by majority vote.279
Proxy contests require a majority voting stake dispersed
among the public, yet very few crowdfunding entrepreneurs
will sell a majority of the voting shares to the crowd.2 o Much
more commonly, the entrepreneur will maintain voting control
herself, making a proxy contest a mathematical impossibility.
Entrepreneurs will keep control to avoid the possibility of a
proxy contest and also to smooth the road for potential future
rounds of funding.2 81 Indeed, this author has suggested that
crowdfunding companies are likely to avoid selling any equity
at all to the crowd, instead offering them debt or other securi-
ties.
To summarize: proxy contests will not be a relevant meth-
od for addressing agency costs in crowdfunded companies be-
the ALI's "Principles of the Law of Software Contracts," 78 U. CHI. L. REv. 165,
168 (2011) (reporting on empirical finding that less than 1% of users read end
user license agreements, or EULAs, for software sold online).
276. See infra Part IV.A.
277. See infra Part IV.B.
278. Public shareholders generally vote via written proxy. See Schwartz,
supra note 3, at 1477-79 (providing further background information on proxy
contests).
279. See, e.g., Julie Jargon et al., New Board Will Set Darden's Menu-
Activist Starboard Wins a Unique Victory, Replacing Restaurant Company's
Entire Set of 12 Directors, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2014, at B3 (reporting on a
successful proxy contest).
280. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1481-82.
281. See id. at 1481.
282. Id. at 1482-89.
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cause crowdfunded companies will rarely sell a majority of the
voting shares to the crowd."'
3. Takeovers
The threat of a takeover bid is widely viewed as among the
most important means of addressing agency costs in public
284
companies. It is unlikely to have the same effect for
crowdfunding companies, however.
When corporate voting power is widely dispersed among
many shareholders, a third party can buy up 51% through a
tender offer, putting herself in position to select the board and
control the corporation. From the perspective of the incumbent
management, who commonly lose their positions, all of this is
generally seen as hostile, hence the term "hostile takeover."
But management can avoid being taken over and replaced by
keeping the share price high and rising over the long run, the
upshot being that the threat of a takeover bid disciplines man-
agers to put forth great effort to raise the share price, an out-
come welcomed by shareholders.28 5
The discipline of takeovers cannot be translated from tra-
ditional public companies to crowdfunded ones. As in the case
of proxy contests,286 Most crowdfunded companies will likely sell
only a minority interest to the crowd, rendering a takeover im-
possible.28 7 In addition, there will likely be only a very limited
and illiquid secondary market for crowdfunded securities.8
283. In the (likely rare) case where a crowdfunding company does sell a
majority of the voting power, perhaps by allowing cumulative voting, a proxy
contest among the crowd may actually be more viable than in the public com-
pany context. Id. at 1477-79.
284. See generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112-13 (1965).
285. See id. at 112; see also HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF EN-
TERPRISE 58 (1996) (oberving that threat of takeover helps keep corporate
management faithful to the corporation).
286. See supra Part III.C.2.
287. Again, in the (likely rare) case where a crowdfunding company does
sell a majority of the voting power, takeover bidders will apparently be free to
engage in at least some coercive tactics that would be unlawful were they at-
tempted with registered securities as they would be unfettered by the Wil-
liams Act, the federal law that governs tender offers for registered securities.
See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1480.
288. Id. at 1463 ("[Als a practical matter there will be a very small second-
ary market for any given crowdfunded security. This is simply because the
number of shares in the marketplace is likely to be orders of magnitude small-
er for a crowdfunded issue than a registered one. Publicly traded companies
issue millions or even billions of shares, making it easy to find someone who
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4. Derivative Actions
Shareholder derivative actions play a significant role in re-
sponding to agency costs for public companies, but they are un-
likely to hold the same import for crowdfunding companies.
Corporate officials owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty
to their corporation, as elaborated in case law. These legal obli-
gations should be, and generally are, taken seriously by such
officials. But if a "corporate official violates any of the duties he
or she owes to the corporation, and the board of directors fails
to take appropriate action, American law recognizes the right of
a shareholder to sue in the corporation's behalf to redress the
injury."2 8 9 This type of lawsuit is called a "derivative" action be-
cause the shareholder's capacity to sue the official derives from
the corporation. Similarly, any recovery in a derivative action
goes to the corporation. Shareholder-plaintiffs regularly file de-
rivative actions against the directors and senior management
of traditional public companies, especially in certain situations,
such as mergers.290 Institutional shareholders may have enough
money at stake to make a derivative action sensible, and plain-
tiff-side attorneys have strong incentives (i.e., fees paid by the
corporation) to bring such actions. In the public company con-
text, in short, derivative actions (including the threat of them)
help discipline corporate management to act as faithful agents
of the corporation.
In the crowdfunding context, shareholder derivative ac-
tions are likely to be of little use, simply because there will be
so much less money at stake. The shareholders will likely be
dispersed, each holding a few shares, making it economically
unreasonable for any one of them to spend their own time and
money bringing a derivative action that would benefit the cor-
poration as a whole. And as for attorneys themselves, the fees
in public company derivative litigation regularly amount to
millions of dollars, so landing just a portion of such work can
maintain a practice. 29 1 For crowdfunded companies, where the
wants to buy or sell a few. Crowdfunded companies, by contrast, are likely to
have only thousands of securities outstanding, making it difficult and expen-
sive to transact in them. For this reason, no liquid secondary market is likely
to develop in crowdfunded securities.").
289. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 162, at 207.
290. See Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Mer-
ger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L.
REV. 557, 557-59 (2015) ("Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mer-
gers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%.").
291. See Adam B. Badawi & Daniel Chen, The Shareholder Wealth Effects
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maximum total fundraising allowed is $1 million, any attor-
neys' fees awarded in derivative litigation will surely amount to
only a fraction of that available in the traditional public com-
pany litigation.
Hence derivative litigation is not likely to be a consequen-
tial method of addressing agency costs in crowdfunded compa-
nies.
5. Activist Shareholders
Traditionally, many public shareholders were widely dis-
persed, meaning that no single shareholder held enough of a
stake to make careful monitoring worthwhile.2 92 That may have
been true in the 1930s, but it no longer describes the contempo-
rary world, where a small group of institutional investors hold
70% of outstanding stock in our major corporations, generally
on behalf of the ultimate beneficial owners.9 Most of these in-
stitutional investors are generally passive-but not all.
So-called "activist" investors find a promising target, buy
up a large stake,294 and then present management with ideas to
raise the value of their shares.2 ' By monitoring and advising
management, activist investors can help reduce agency costs at
public companies. And if their concerns are not met, activists
can use hardball tactics, such as a proxy fight, to convince or
force management to accept their intervention.2 99
Activist investing will not be appropriate for crowdfunding.
First, there is not enough money involved. The model of activist
investing is that they need a large initial investment to give
them the economic motivation to engage a target and try to
raise its value.297 Yet the amounts at stake in crowdfunded
companies will likely be too small for activists to bother with.
of Delaware Litigation (Sept. 5, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://users
.nber.org/-dlchen/papers/Delaware.pdf.
292. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 166, at 47-65.
293. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 123.
294. Id. at 900 n.123 ("The activist shareholder's predisclosure acquisition
of a significant toehold is critical to its business model.").
295. Id. at 896 (explaining that activists aim to "identify strategic and gov-
ernance shortfalls with significant valuation consequences, to acquire a posi-
tion in a company with governance-related underperformance, and then to
present reticent institutions with their value proposition: a specified change in
the portfolio company's strategy or structure").
296. See, e.g., Jargon et al., supra note 279.
297. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 123, at 902-04 (describing the im-
portance of a substantial "toehold" investment).
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The maximum amount a crowdfunding company can issue is $1
million, but the usual toeholds by public company activists are
many times that total amount. Second, there is unlikely to be
much of a secondary market for crowdfunded securities, and
definitely not one as deep and liquid as for traditional public
298
companies.
In short, activist investing will not be a useful mechanism
for addressing agency costs in crowdfunded companies.
6. Equity-Based Compensation
Public companies use equity-based compensation to ad-
dress agency costs. 9 9 Paying senior executives a significant por-
tion of their compensation in stock or stock options is designed
to align the executives' personal interest with that of the com-
pany as a whole. 00 If the company becomes more valuable, the
stock price rises, and the executive's pay increases; if the share
price drops, her pay will decrease. The precise way in which
public companies use equity-based compensation varies and is
the subject of significant scholarly attention.301 How long should
the executive have to hold on to the stock?30 2 Should the strike
price ever be reset?0 3 For present purposes it is sufficient to ob-
serve that equity-based compensation is a widely used tech-
nique among public companies to address agency costs, and
that there is a deep and well-established literature on best
.- *304practices in doing so.
298. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1463 ("[Tlhere will be a very small sec-
ondary market for any given crowdfunded security."); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d-l(e) (2012) (restricting the secondary market for crowdfunded securi-
ties).
299. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extrac-
tion in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 753-54
(2002).
300. This is very similar to the rationale for equity-based compensation in
the VC context. See supra Part III.A.4.
301. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 209; Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta
Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the
Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 361 (2009).
302. E.g., Bhagat & Romano, supra note 301 (suggesting that executives be
forced to hold company stock for two to four years after leaving the firm).
303. Google famously reset employees' stock option strike price in 2009 af-
ter a 50% drop in the share price. See Martin Peers, Google's Optional Wind-
fall, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2009, at C10.
304. See, e.g., David I. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?,
84 B.U. L. REV. 695, 697-708 (2004) (summarizing literature on equity-based
compensation).
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Even so, equity-based compensation will not translate well
to the crowdfunding context for the same reasons discussed in
Part III.A.4. Management will likely already hold most or all of
the equity in the company, meaning that any additional incen-
tive from equity-based compensation will be modest.
7. Appraisal and Weinberger
Finally, appraisal and so-called Weinberger.o. actions are
both important mechanisms for addressing agency costs in pub-
lic companies. Indeed, "appraisal arbitrage" has lately become a
darling among hedge funds, who buy up shares for the express
purpose of pursuing a praisal.ac6 And Weinberger cases contin-
ue to make headlines.
Appraisal and Weinberger are both used to contain a con-
trolling shareholder who might otherwise act opportunistically
toward the minority shareholders.os For a variety of reasons,
controlling shareholders commonly seek to eject the minority
shareholders without their consent through a so-called "cash-
out merger," the result of which is that the majority sharehold-
er winds up with 100% of the shares, and the other sharehold-
ers end up with cash.0 9 A cash-out merger can be used equita-
bly, but it can also be abused by a controlling shareholder that
tries to cash out the minority for a pittance. The law allows a
special remedy for shareholders who feel that the cash out price
they were offered was unfairly low: appraisal.1 o An appraisal
action is a trial-like proceeding in which the court takes evi-
dence and ultimately awards the shareholder the "fair value" of
her shares."' And for those who prefer, they can bring a Wein-
berger -type action claiming that the majority violated its fi-
305. Named after Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
306. See Liz Hoffman, Risky Legal Ploy Seeks to Milk Buyouts, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 14, 2014, at C1 (reporting on the "rise of 'appraisal arbitrage,' in which
hedge funds buy shares of companies on the brink of a buyout and ask a judge
to award them a higher price").
307. E.g., Michael J. de la Merced, Judge Finds Chief of Dole Fraudulently
Drove Down Its Stock Price Before Buyout, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2015, at B6(reporting on a high-profile Weinberger action involving Dole Food Co. that re-
sulted in a $148 million judgment against two individuals).
308. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 705 (A "majority shareholder ... owe[s] a fi-
duciary responsibility to. . . [the] minority.").
309. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 162, at 215.
310. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2015).
311. This amount may be higher or lower than the original cash-out offer.
Id.
312. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 701.
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duciary duty by offering an unfair price or running an unfair
process.
The mere presence of appraisal and Weinberger helps dis-
courage majority shareholders from cashing people out at an
unfairly low price in the first place. Can this translate from the
public company context to the crowdfunding context? Perhaps.
Digital shareholders clearly face a risk of being treated inequi-
tably by a controlling shareholder, the situation to which ap-
praisal and Weinberger relate."' Appraisal and Weinberger re-
spond directly to these sorts of issues314 and may prove useful
for digital shareholders."' On the other hand, they may not be
cost-effective for small startups where there is a relatively
small amount at stake.
In short, appraisal and Weinberger may be utilized by digi-
tal shareholders to address agency costs in crowdfunded com-
panies, but these are relatively weak mechanisms.
This Part asked whether any of the traditional solutions
used by VCs, angels, and public shareholders to address the
three fundamental problems of entrepreneurial finance can be
applied to crowdfunding. It showed that most of the traditional
techniques, including the most powerful of them, hold little rel-
evance for crowdfunding. As such, the next and final Part in-
troduces a number of new and different methods-ones not cur-
rently in use by VCs, angels or public shareholders-that can
effectively address the three problems in the distinctive digital
context of crowdfunding.
313. See Wroldsen, supra note 13, at 612 (describing inter-shareholder con-
flict).
314. Another potentially relevant rule of corporate law is the line of doc-
trine holding that shareholders of closely held corporations owe each other fi-
duciary duties, whose seminal case is Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353
N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
315. One might reasonably ask why the problem of an insufficient pool for
attorneys' fees will not pose a problem in the context of appraisal or Wein-
berger actions, when such a problem was previously discussed in connection
with derivative actions. See supra Part III.C.4. One answer is that appraisal
and Weinberger cases will generally arise among successful companies, includ-
ing those that obtain venture capital or other sources of funding beyond the
crowd, meaning more money will be at stake. Also, the issue will be the fair
value of the shares, and that represents a unique opportunity for substantial
awards that is not similarly present in ordinary derivative actions, which may
relate to much smaller concerns with subsequently small damage awards.
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IV. DIGITAL METHODS TO ADDRESS THE THREE
PROBLEMS IN CROWDFUNDING
Crowdfunding will take place in a lightly regulated... digi-
tal space that is new and different from the familiar worlds of
VC, angels, and public companies, and thus needs new and ad-
ditional responses to the fundamental problems of uncertainty,
information asymmetry, and agency costs. This Part proposes
for crowdfunding a set of novel solutions to the trio of problems;
novel in the sense that they are not currently employed in VC,
angel investing, or public companies. These proposed solutions
are all meant to suit the institutional context of crowdfunding,
where digital shareholders will interact with companies via the
Internet. "
These five mechanisms are presented in the rough chrono-
logical order of when each would be called upon in the life of a
crowdfunded company. The wisdom of the crowd (Part IV.A)
and the crowdsourcing of information (Part IV.B) will be most
relevant when a company launches a crowdfunding campaign
and potential investors are deciding whether to invest. Online
reputation (Part IV.C) and securities-based compensation (Part
IV.D) come into play both during the campaign and after the
company receives the money. Digital monitoring (Part IV.E) is
mainly important after the company receives the funds.
316. The regulatory burden is light compared to traditional public offer-
ings. It may not be light in an absolute sense, and numerous commentators
believe the regulatory obligations will be insurmountably high. See, e.g., Joan
MacLeod Heminway, How Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale
of Political Pressure, Hasty Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments that Begs for a
Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J. 865, 867 (2013-2014) ("The provisions of the
CROWDFUND Act . . . create a significant cost structure that is not likely to
be outweighed by the benefits of a crowdfunded offering conducted under the
Act. . . ."); Hurt, supra note 16, at 252-54 ("Equity Crowdfunding Is Doomed
Because Section 4(6) Is Too Costly and Burdensome on Issuers and Portals");
Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 12, at 1605-06 ("[T]he regulatory costs
are likely to take too much of the small amount of money that can be raised.").
317. It must be acknowledged that "the Internet" as we now understand it
could and probably will continue to change and evolve in unpredictable ways.
For example, there was a time when most people experienced the Internet
through browsers and the worldwide web; these days, smartphones and apps
have become the norm. Future changes to the Internet are likely and impossi-
ble to predict, so this Part does not intend to suggest an exhaustive list. Ra-
ther, other effective solutions, beyond those presented in this Part or presently
conceivable to this author, will likely arise as a "[product] of human action, but
not the result of human design." FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND
EcoNOMIC ORDER 7 (1948).
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A. THE WISDOM OF THE CROWD
Investing in startups with no track record through online
crowdfunding presents tremendous uncertainty and infor-
mation asymmetries for investors. How should a potential
crowdfunding investor pick which company to invest in? She
would like to invest in one that will succeed, yet she knows that
she cannot accurately predict how a set of startup companies
will turn out-and she is surely right on that score. But re-
search has shown that large groups of people-crowds-can col-
lectively do a pretty good job at forecasting the future, regard-
less of whether the crowd is rational or comprised of experts.
This "wisdom of the crowd" has a clear and important applica-
tion to crowdfunding where it can be a powerful tool to address
both uncertainty and information asymmetry.
A well-established body of scientific literature shows that
groups are better at finding facts and making predictions than
lone individuals, even experts.1 9 Moreover, this phenomenon is
enhanced when people have a financial stake in being right,320
as will be the case in crowdfunding. Because they will be risk-
ing their own money, potential investors will take the exercise
seriously.
This wisdom of crowds can be seen in numerous fields.32 2
For one example, the Iowa Electronic Markets-an online fu-
tures market where traders buy and sell contracts whose pay-
offs depend on the outcome of elections and other events-have
been able to predict presidential and other elections more accu-
rately than traditional polls. 3 23 For another, consider the
Nenana Ice Classic, an annual betting pool dating from 1917
where Alaskans try to predict the exact date and time when the
ice covering the Tanana River will break up, marking the start
318. SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at xiii-xiv, 29-32 ("Even if most of the
people within a group are not especially well-informed or rational, it can still
reach a collectively wise decision.").
319. See, e.g., id. at 31-32 ("[Al large group of diverse individuals will come
up with better and more robust forecasts and make more intelligent decisions
than even the most skilled [individual acting alone]."); Karsten Hueffer et al.,
The Wisdom of Crowds: Predicting a Weather and Climate-Related Event, 8
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 91, 91 (Mar. 2013). For crowdfunding, where
investors will have to gauge the future performance of various startup compa-
nies, predictions will be more important than fact-finding.
320. See MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS
FOR PUBLIC AND PRivATE DECISION MAKING ix-x (2007).
321. See id.
322. See generally SUROWIECKI, supra note 114.
323. Id. at 17-19.
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of spring.324 It turns out that the average of all the participants'
predictions is at least as accurate as any expert model in fore-
casting the ice break up.2 Many other examples of the wisdom
of the crowd could be given.
The wisdom of the crowd is not due to some mystical phe-
nomenon or mental convergence, but rather a simple mathe-
matical consequence of averaging.2 If one person guesses too
327high and another too low, their average response is spot on.
But the crowd is not necessarily wise; it depends on the crowd
being sufficiently diverse in terms of their knowledge, skills
and perspectives.32' A crowd of like-minded people will do no
better than an individual because they "share the same exper-
tise-and the same blindspots.... From a wisdom-of-crowds
perspective, it is as if you do not have a crowd."2
A diverse crowd, by contrast, is a potent force for discover-
ing hidden truths and forecasting uncertain outcomes. This
goes back to the reason why the wisdom of the crowd effect ex-
ists in the first place: averaging. Diverse people will make dif-
ferent mistakes, which in the aggregate will encircle the truth.
A homogenous crowd will all make the same mistakes, so even
their average answer will be off the mark. For instance, when
forecasting a given outcome, a crowd made up of optimists will
consistently overestimate it, 3 0 but a group made up of opti-
mists, pessimists, and realists will, on average, get close to the
truth.
324. Hueffer et al., supra note 319, at 92.
325. Id. at 93.
326. Richard P. Larrick et al., The Social Psychology of the Wisdom of
Crowds, in SOCIAL JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 227, 229 (Joachim 1.
Krueger ed., 2012) ("Combining judgments takes individual imperfection and
smoothes the rough edges to isolate the collective's view of the truth. Or, to
put it more mathematically and mundanely, averaging cancels error.").
327. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at 5 (explaining that aggregating
and averaging a group's individual guesses is likely to produce good results).
328. See Hueffer et al., supra note 319 ("[Glroups can be more accurate
than most individuals to the extent to which each group is diverse."). The rele-
vant type of diversity is cognitive, not sociological. See SUROWIECKI, supra
note 114, at 183.
329. Larrick et al., supra note 326, at 231; see SUROWIECKI, supra note 114,
at 36-39 (discussing "groupthink").
330. As a possible example, the Federal Reserve's forecast for economic
growth was significantly higher than the growth that eventuated in each of
the past five years. Dylan Matthews, This Graph Shows How Bad the Fed Is
at Predicting the Future, WONKBLOG (June 19, 2013), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/19/this-graph-shows-how-bad
-the-fed-is-at-predicting-the-future.
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Crowdfunding is well positioned to capitalize on the wis-
dom of crowds.33 1 Once it commences, crowdfunding will gather
together a large group of investors on Internet portals to collec-
tively judge the prospects of the various startups seeking fund-
ing. Importantly, this crowd will likely be a diverse one for all
the reasons discussed above in Part I.B.2. It will include digital
shareholders of every age, ethnicity, gender, geography, etc.
Diversity of perspectives is the key to the success of the wisdom
of the crowd,332 and it should work well for crowdfunding."
On crowdfunding portals, each investor will select the in-
vestments that seem most promising to her. Over time, as the
crowd of investors weighs in, some companies will prove popu-
lar with the crowd, others not so. The net effect will be a collec-
tive prediction of which investments opportunities are the most
attractive, like a stock exchange with no securities analysts, no
CNBC, and no Wall Street Journal.' One might expect chaos
and anarchy, but the "wisdom of the crowd" theory suggests
that digital shareholders will do a relatively good job at picking
winners. 5
Few digital shareholders will be experts on any field in
which they might invest, but all of them will be able to add
something to the collective effort. Information, as Friedrich
Hayek famously explained, is not concentrated in some central
repository. 36 Rather, the information needed to transact, build
companies and generate economic growth is splintered among
331. See Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 12 ("Enthusiasts for
crowdfunding stressed that Internet offerings would harness the 'wisdom of
the crowds' to separate the good business plans from the deficient (or cor-
rupt).").
332. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at 183 ("I mean not sociological di-
versity but rather cognitive diversity.").
333. This is not a certainty. It is possible that the crowd that forms on
crowdfunding portals will be single-minded and foolish, rather than diverse
and wise, but the open nature of the form indicates that the latter is more like-
ly.
334. Admittedly, this collective prediction will surely be imperfect and at
least some poor prospects will receive funding. The idea is merely that, on av-
erage, there is wisdom in the crowd's predictions.
335. Some commentators expect that crowdfunding investors will have only
poor investments to choose from because no high-quality companies will
choose to employ crowdfunding. E.g., Dorff, supra note 14, at 520. If these crit-
ics are correct, the only good decision for the crowd would be to abandon the
market entirely, rather than try to pick among the offerings. Still, that would
be a good decision and one that can be made with the help of the crowd.
336. See, e.g., Hayek, supra note 241, at 524 (discussing the difficulty of
concentrating statistical information in the hands of central planners).
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countless people, each of whom only holds a small piece of it.33 7
By coming together on crowdfunding portals, members of the
crowd will each contribute the piece that they have.
Admittedly, predicting how startup companies will perform
is more complex and open-ended than predicting who will win
an election3 3 8 or when the ice will break up. 3 3 9 But the wisdom of
the crowd theory applies to complex questions too.34 0 A group of
online gamers were able to solve a complex problem in AIDS
research that had eluded scientists for years."' A group of pro-
fessionals in many fields were able to find a submarine that
had vanished without a trace.3 42 The crowd drafted an encyclo-
pedia that stacks up with the best in the world.34 3 Thus, "com-
plexity is no bar" to the emergence of the wisdom of the
crowd.3 " Moreover, the ultimate question in crowdfunding in-
vesting is binary-buy or pass-so while the considerations are
complex, the ultimate answer is either zero or one.
Certain aspects of the CROWDFUND Act are specifically
designed to enhance the wisdom of the crowd effect. First, the
Act provides that only those offerings that meet a predeter-
mined goal will actually get funded; for those that fall short, all
the pledged investments will be nullified.34 5 Second, the Act
gives investors the right to cancel a commitment to invest once
made. 3 46 The effect of both of these provisions will be that any
individual investor who selects a "bad"-meaning unpopular-
investment will be saved from her poor choice by the wisdom of
337. See id. at 526 (describing how even diffuse information will eventually
lead to the same outcome as if that information was held by one person).
338. See supra text accompanying note 323.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 324-25.
340. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at xvii.
341. Firas Khatib et al., Crystal Structure of a Monomeric Retroviral Prote-
ase Solved by Protein Folding Game Players, 18 NATURE STRUCTURAL & MO-
LECULAR BIOLOGY 1175, 1177 (2011).
342. SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at xx.
343. Aniket Kittur & Robert E. Kraut, Harnessing the Wisdom of Crowds
in Wikipedia: Quality Through Coordination, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2008
ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK 37, 45
(2008) ("Wikipedia is both an existence proof and a model for how complex
cognitive tasks with high coordination requirements can be effectively
achieved through distributed methods.").
344. SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at xvii.
345. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(7) (2012).
346. Id. This right is expressly implemented at 15 C.F.R. § 237.304(a) in
the regulations. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,558 (proposed Nov. 15,
2013) (notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R.
§ 227.304(a)).
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the crowd. She will not walk off the cliff alone, but will be
pulled back to safety by the crowd.
The wisdom of the crowd will benefit crowdfunding entre-
preneurs as well as investors. A startup that may appear un-
promising to venture capitalists, angel investors and other tra-
ditional sources of startup funding might catch the eye of a few
members of the crowd. Due to the large size and heterogeneity
of digital shareholders, "the chances that at least someone will
take a gamble on a radical or unlikely idea obviously increas-
es."34 ' There may be lots of welfare-enhancing companies that
can grow through crowdfunding whose promise would only be
recognized by a relatively few people who happen to hold the
relevant information, and the odds are much greater to find
them among the crowd rather than accredited investors. For
example, a company that wanted to sell specialized cleats for
ultimate would need to find those pockets of players who recog-
nize that this is an unmet consumer desire.48
In conclusion, the wisdom of the crowd can help address
both uncertainty and information asymmetry in the
crowdfunding context.
B. CROWDSOURCED INVESTMENT ANALYSIS
Beyond the tacit collaboration of the wisdom of the crowd,
potential investors can share what they know on the Internet
for others to see, add to and comment upon. Using online
chatrooms, bulletin boards and the like, potential investors and
others can directly communicate with one another and share
material information about various crowdfunding invest-
ments.3 48 This type of crowdsourcing350 holds great promise as a
347. SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at 29.
348. See generally What is Ultimate?, USA ULTIMATE, http://www
.usaultimate.org/about (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
349. See BRABHAM, supra note 31, at 12-13. This is analogous to the prac-
tice of syndication, or group investing, which allows VC investors to "obtain
each other's judgment with respect to particular investment opportunities."
Bartlett, supra note 17, at 56.
350. See generally BRABHAM, supra note 31; Jeff Howe, The Rise of
Crowdsourcing, WIRED, June 2006, at 176 (origin of the term). The present
Article uses "crowdsourcing" in a loose sense. See JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURC-
ING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS
280 (2008) (loosely defining crowdsourcing as "an umbrella term for a highly
varied group of approaches that share one obvious attribute in common: they
all depend on some contribution from the crowd"); Lee Anne Fennell,
Crowdsourcing Land Use, 78 BROOK. L. REv. 385, 385 n.2 (2013) (using the
term in a "loose manner"). For instance, Yochai Benkler's concept of "com-
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response to uncertainty and information asymmetry in
crowdfunding, and its use has been endorsed by the SEC."'
Crowdsourcing is a voluntary online activity that "leverag-
es the collective intelligence of online communities" to achieve a
concrete result.3 5 2 Wikipedia is a crowdsourced encyclopedia
that has proven about as reliable as other leading encyclopedi-
as."' NASA uses crowdsourcing to sort through millions of pho-
tographs taken from space, on the theory that someone familiar
with a given locale could easily identify it, whereas few others,
nor computers, could readily do so.35 Other examples abound,
355including less formal structures like chat groups, email lists,
blogs and other online communities where people gather and
share information on a sports team, pet breed, or any other
subject. 356
These sorts of efforts translate well to crowdfunding. Just
as thousands of people contribute to Wikipedia and perform
other crowdsourced work for free, potential investors can inves-
tigate companies and share their findings with the crowd.5
Difficult implementation questions need to be worked out, such
as whether participants would have to register with their real
names, or if anonymous posting would be allowed.5
mons-based peer production" comes within this Article's conception of
crowdsourcing. Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of
the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 375 (2002). This is as opposed to the strict defini-
tions suggested by some in the literature which would exclude Wikipedia and
other projects that are popularly conceived as crowdsourced. E.g., BRABHAM,
supra note 31, at 2-3, 7-8 (expressly excluding Benkler's idea from a formal
definition of crowdsourcing).
351. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,430 (describing the sharing of
information as one of the "central tenets" of crowdfunding).
352. BRABHAM, supra note 31, at xix.
353. See Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head to Head, 438 NATURE
900, 901 (2005) (finding that Wikipedia is nearly as accurate as the Ency-
clopaedia Britannica, at least with regard to scientific articles).
354. See Eliott C. McLaughlin, Image Overload: Help Us Sort It All Out,
NASA Requests, CNN (Aug. 18, 2014, 8:55 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/
17/tech/nasa-earth-images-help-needed.
355. By this I mean an online bulletin board where people can post mes-
sages and reply to those previously posted.
356. See, e.g., THE BEST RAT TERRIER SITE ON THE WEB, httpI//www.rat
-terrier.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
357. This already happens in related spaces, such as peer-to-peer lending.
See Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 445, 464-65 (2011).
358. Anonymity might enhance the accuracy of the discussion in some cas-
es, but it may also diminish it in others. See BRABHAM, supra note 31, at 13
("Anonymity is important for online collaboration, especially when people ex-
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As for expertise, few potential investors will be experts in a
formal sense,359 but some surely will. Among a large enough
crowd, there is sure to be somebody with expertise in any given
field, simply as a matter of numbers.o Moreover, there are at
least some companies that may seek to use crowdfunding that
already have an online community of customers or users who
are especially knowledgeable about that company.3 6 1 If any of
these types of experts share their knowledge on the bulletin
board, then the whole crowd can become well informed.362
More important than formal expertise, however, is the idea
that practically every member of the crowd knows something
that others do not; something particular to their personal expe-
rience, skills, and perspective.6 Each of these distributed bits
of information standing alone may not be significant. But gath-
ered together, they constitute a sort of collective wisdom on just
about any subject that may arise.
Indeed, the SEC's Regulation Crowdfunding envisions
crowdsourced investor research of this sort: "Individuals inter-
ested in the crowdfunding campaign-members of the 'crowd'-
may share information about the project, cause, idea or busi-
ness with each other and use the information to decide whether
or not to fund the campaign based on the collective 'wisdom of
the crowd.'"" Moreover, the regulation specifically authorizes
press ideas and opinions to a commons.").
359. See supra Part I.B.2.
360. See Dorff, supra note 14 ("Some crowdfunders may have relevant ex-
perience . . . .").
361. Nut-butter company, Justin's, for instance, has received over 120,000
likes on Facebook. Justin's, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
JustinsNutButter (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). Presumably, many of these fans
are intimately familiar with the company's products. See also Leslie Josephs,
Nut-Butter Firm's Founder Adjusts to Growth, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2015, at
B5 (reporting that early fundraisings for the company were on the order of
$25,000 to $100,000, which would have been appropriate for securities
crowdfunding, had it existed at the time).
362. There is reason to expect that they will do so. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 364-88.
363. Hayek, supra note 241, at 519 ("[Slcientific knowledge is not the sum
of all knowledge. . . . [Tihere is beyond question [another] body of very im-
portant but unorganized knowledge[,] .. . the knowledge of the particular cir-
cumstances of time and place. It is with respect to this that practically every
individual has some advantage over all others in that he possesses unique in-
formation of which beneficial use might be made . . . .").
364. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,429 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013)
(notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,
227, 232, 239-40, 249). This already happens with respect to publicly traded
companies, as hedge funds and others use blogs, Twitter and other online fo-
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funding portals to "[p]rovide communication channels by which
investors can communicate with one another and with repre-
sentatives of the issuer through the funding portal's platform
about offerings through the platform," subject to certain condi-
tions, including public access."
But is this realistic? Why would someone with good infor-
mation about a given investment post it on a bulletin board and
share it with other members of the crowd for free? Securities
analysts and hedge funds, who play an analogous role for tradi-
tional public companies, tend keep their findings and opinions
secret or share them only with a limited number of clients or
other parties.
Apart from altruism, a desire for fame, or other
nonpecuniary reasons,6 is there an economic rationale for digi-
tal shareholders to share information with one another? Yes
there is, one that comes directly from the interplay of two com-
ponents of crowdfunding, at least as conceived by the federal
JOBS Act.
First, each crowdfunding investor faces an annual cap of
5% of their income or net worth in all crowdfunded securities
each year.36' For most Americans, this works out to be some-
where between $2500 and $5000 per year in all crowdfunded
investments. 69 Second, crowdfunding companies must an-
nounce their fundraising goal in advance and will only receive
the money if they reach or exceed that goal .o
The combined effect of these two rules is that a potential
investor who spots a great opportunity has a powerful economic
rums to "talk their book." See, e.g., Steven Russolillo, The iCahn Effect: Apple's
Market Cap Jumps by $17 Billion After Tweets, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT
(Aug. 13, 2013, 4:59 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/08/13/the
-icahn-effect-apples-market-cap-jumps-by-17-billion-after-tweets ("Activist in-
vestor Carl Icahn disclosed on Twitter Tuesday afternoon a 'large position' in
Apple Inc., the tech giant which he deemed 'extremely undervalued.'. . . Apple
shares jumped on the news, rising as much as 5.8%. . . . From the moment
that Icahn tweeted through Tuesday's intraday high, Apple had gained $17.1
billion in market value ... .).
365. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,560.
366. See David Benoit, Hedge Funds Learn Secrets Not So Safe, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 26, 2015, at Cl ("In the hedge-fund world, there is no more closely
guarded secret than what stock a firm is preparing to target.").
367. See generally Schwartz, supra note 126 (describing the non-monetary
rewards of participating in crowdfunding).
368. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i) (2012). Wealthy investors can invest up to
10%. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii).
369. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1461.
370. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(7).
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incentive to share her views widely. The investment cap pre-
vents a single investor from funding a company on her own.3 7' If
she keeps her information secret and the company does not
catch the attention of other investors, it will not reach its goal
and no securities will be sold. By contrast, if such an investor
shares her information on the Internet, it is more likely that
the issuer will reach its goal and she will get the securities she
wants. In short, crowdfunding promotes cooperation. Those
with valuable information about crowdfunding companies have
a powerful incentive to give that information away, including
on an Internet bulletin board.7
Furthermore, reputation feedback systems of the sort dis-
cussed in the next Section could enhance the efficacy of
crowdsourced investment analysis.7  Commenters could receive
votes and build up reputations for the value of their comments,
which would improve the system.
One potential problem with crowdsourced investment in-
formation is that it might give rise to market manipulation. For
instance, the issuer could ask a friend (or set of friends) to post
false information in order to obtain the initial investment.
Simple fraud like this is surely possible, but it seems unlikely
to develop into a major problem because the gravity of the con-
sequences and the chances of detection are both relatively high,
while the potential returns are rather modest. The
371. There are extreme circumstances where this might not hold and a sin-
gle investor could fund an entire issuance. Because the CROWDFUND Act al-
lows those with an income or net worth over $100,000 to invest 10%, up to an
absolute limit of $100,000, there is the possibility that a single person could
buy up a huge chunk, even 100%, of the crowdfunded securities from a given
company. This appears to be an unlikely scenario.
372. A similar sort of platform, called SumZero, already exists for profes-
sional investment analysts to share their proprietary investment reports with
one another in an online forum. See About SumZero, SUMZERO, https://
sumzero.com/about (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (claiming to have "more than
12,000 pre-screened professionals"); Sum of Its Parts: Web Site Combines Idea
Database, Networking, FINALTERNATivEs (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www
.finalternatives.com/node/7348 ("A new Web site is seeking to combine two of
the more revolutionary and successful ideas in recent Internet history, Wik-
ipedia and social networking, for the benefit of the buyside community."). A
key difference between SumZero and crowdsourced investment analysis is that
the former is an exclusive network only open to professionals whose applica-
tions are accepted, whereas crowdsourced investment analysis for
crowdfunding will be open to all.
373. See infra Part IV.C.2.
374. SumZero explicitly incorporates the concept of reputation. See About
SumZero, supra note 372 ("[Tlhe platform . . . enables members to build a
track record . . .).
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CROWDFUND Act has powerful anti-fraud provisions, 7 and it
also empowers state authorities as well as jilted investors376 to
sue issuers and other parties who engage in wrongdoing such
as this. Furthermore, everyone who posts information will be
logged in, making it a cinch to track down who said what. Giv-
en all this, it seems that issuers with fraudulent intentions
would have better luck elsewhere.
Manipulation by third parties in the secondary market will
be even less of a concern. Consider the example of the pump-
and-dump scheme where stockholders circulate market-moving
but false information to drive up the price of their shares, and
then sell and book profits before the truth comes out. Such ma-
nipulation requires a secondary market of substantial size to
make it worthwhile, but that will not generally be the case for
crowdfunded companies. For one thing, the JOBS Act expressly
prohibits a secondary market for a year after issuance." Even
after that, the number of shares available will generally be too
small to make practical a secondary market.7
Finally, putting intentional manipulation aside, there is
also the possibility that, instead of being wise and thoughtful,
the crowd could act with a mob or herd mentality of the sort
that has led to asset bubbles from the Dutch Tulips of the sev-
enteenth century to the housing bubble of our own. By com-
municating with one another on the Internet, the crowd could
suffer from "groupthink" thanks to issues like anchoring or
information cascadess.3 " Anyone who has ever chosen a restau-
375. The regulations contemplate incorporating already-existing anti-fraud
measures and requires intermediaries to comply with specific, additional
measures. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,556 (proposed Nov. 5,
2013) (notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R.
§ 227.301).
376. State regulators can disqualify issuers for misconduct, id. at 66,562,
and the statute includes a private right of action, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c) (2012).
377. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(e).
378. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1463 ("[Als a practical matter there will
be a very small secondary market for any given crowdfunded security."); id.
("[N]o liquid secondary market is likely to develop in crowdfunded securi-
ties.").
379. "When people are asked to generate an estimate, they frequently an-
chor on an obvious or convenient number . . . and then adjust upward or
downward .... This procedure naturally leads to estimations which are
skewed toward the initial value." Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 630, 667 (1999).
380. An information cascade is a herding-like effect where people disregard
their own private information and adopt the popular view if they observe suf-
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rant simply because it is crowded understands the concept of
an information cascade. The restaurant might be crowded be-
cause it is high quality; alternatively, it might be low-quality
and the initial diners simply made a mistake that many others
followed.'
Anchoring and information cascades like this could under-
mine the effectiveness of crowdsourcing investor information.
For instance, if enough people on an Internet chat board seem
to think the investment is a good one, others might latch on to
the popularity of that view and adopt it as their own, regard-
less of its underlying merit. This "lemming problem" 3 8 2 can al-
ready be observed in reward crowdfunding, where popular pro-
jects appear to take off once they hit a certain level of
funding.
Fortunately, there is good reason to think that anchoring
and information cascades will not be fatal in the context of
crowdfunding because investors are likely to feel and act inde-
pendent from one another. Research shows that groups of peo-
ple are "far more likely to come up with a good decision if the
people in the group are independent of each other.",3 Inde-
pendence is important because "it keeps the mistakes that peo-
ple make from becoming correlated" and because "independent
individuals are more likely to have new information."385
On crowdfunding websites, there will be no institutional
investors to set the tone with their gravitas, and while accred-
ited investors will be invited, they will be on the same level as
everyone else. Furthermore, people on the Internet tend to act
individualistically and are willing to challenge one another.8
Finally, the lack of face-to-face contact in crowdfunding may
reduce the likelihood of the sort of mimicry that is found among
groups of animals and people.8 None of this ensures that
ficiently many other people taking that view. See CASS SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA
88-91 (2006); SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at 53-55.
381. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at 54-55.
382. I credit Seth Oranburg with coining this term.
383. See Agrawal et al., supra note 222, at 13 ("[Ilnvestors' propensity to
invest in a given week increases as the entrepreneur visibly accumulates capi-
tal on the site.").
384. SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at 41.
385. Id.
386. See id. at 42.
387. See id. at 43 (describing a psychology experiment involving a group of
people on a street corner looking up at nothing).
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members of the crowd will act independently from one anoth-
er,18 8 but it does enhance that possibility.
In sum, crowdsourced investor information is a promising
method for crowdfunding to address the fundamental problems
of uncertainty and information asymmetry, yet anchoring and
information cascades may hinder this mechanism.
C. ONLINE REPUTATION
The online reputation of founders, promoters, and manag-
ers of crowdfunded companies can be used to address both in-
formation asymmetry and agency costs in a manner well suited
to crowdfunding's institutional context. Insiders can signal to
investors that they are committed to and believe in the compa-
ny by putting their online reputation on the line by, for in-
stance, linking to their Facebook or other social media page on
their crowdfunding campaign." This reduces information
asymmetry. Furthermore, by putting their online reputation in
play, insiders can provide a bond-a credible promise-that
agency costs will be modest (i.e., they will work diligently and
faithfully for the investors' benefit).
Reputation is a summary or representation of society's
opinion of an individual or organization.9 0 Once such infor-
mation is aggregated, reputations "can help other community
members make decisions with respect to whether and how to
relate to that individual," such as whether to trust them.39 In
this way, reputations "create[] powerful incentives for good be-
havior." 3 9 2 Furthermore, the Internet is well suited to keeping
388. In particular, if certain members of the crowd are perceived as ex-
perts, see supra Part IV.B, others may follow their advice rather than render-
ing an independent analysis.
389. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1472 ("There is every reason to believe
that crowdfunding issuers and intermediaries can and will use Facebook or
other types of social media to promote their offerings to a wide audience at low
cost.").
390. See LAWRENCE MCNAMARA, REPUTATION AND DEFAMATION 31 (2007);
Chris Stiff, Are They Bothered? How the Opportunity To Damage a Partner's
Reputation Influences Giving Behavior in a Trust Game, 148 J. Soc. PSYCHOL.
609, 610 (2008) (defining reputation as "an aggregation of socially shared in-
formation regarding a potential interaction partner").
391. Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Designing Reputation Systems for the Social
Web, in THE REPUTATION SOCIETY 4 (Hassan Masum & Mark Tovey eds.,
2011); see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 31(2007).
392. Gail L. Rein, A Reference Model for Designing Effective Reputation In-
formation Systems, 31 J. INFO. Sci. 365, 365 (2005).
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careful track of one's reputation.'" The upshot is that online
reputation represents a promising method for addressing in-
formation asymmetry and agency costs in the crowdfunding
context.
Reputation is extremely useful in enabling successful in-
teractions between transacting parties, such as buyers and
sellers. 3 94 The existence of a reputation "informs others about [a
seller's] abilities and dispositions," and can be used to select
39trustworthy counterparties. Reputation can also be a power-
ful disincentive for bad behavior. Since a good reputation ena-
bles business transactions, it is implicit that a bad reputation
would discourage business transactions.3 9 6 "By ensuring that
people are accountable for their actions, reputation gives people
a strong incentive to conform to social norms and to avoid
breaching people's trust." 9' This is why sellers care about hav-
ing a good reputation. Thanks to reputational constraints,
"both individuals and organizations feel a lot of pressure to fol-
low the group norms."" In this way, reputation encourages
good behavior.
In the context of crowdfunding, where all transactions will
take place on the Internet, online reputation will likely prove to
be an important way to address information asymmetry and
agency costs. Scholars of privacy law have shown that living in
the Internet age makes it effectively impossible to remain
anonymous, which is itself a key factor in allowing for misbe-
havior.40 0 For example, studies have shown that drivers engage
401in more misbehavior on the road when they feel anonymous
Drivers of convertibles drive less aggressively when they have
393. See id. at 375 ("Time Stamp records the precise time (year, month,
day, minute, and second) of the reputation rating.").
394. See id. at 365.
395. Id. at 365-66.
396. See SOLOVE, supra note 391.
397. Id. at 32; see id. at 31 ("In many circumstances, we look to people's
reputation to decide whether to trust them.").
398. BRUCE SCHNEIER, LIARS AND OUTLIERS 9 (2012).
399. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 8
(2013).
400. See SOLOVE, supra note 391, at 33 ("No longer can people hide in ob-
scurity and escape accountability for their actions."); id. ("The Internet . . .
makes gossip a permanent reputational stain, one that never fades. It is avail-
able around the world, and with Google it can be readily found in less than a
second.").
401. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, "How's My Driving?" for Everyone (and
Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1705 (2006).
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the top down;402 commercial drivers with "How's My Driving?"
stickers drive much more safely than those without.0 o
Internet-based securities crowdfunding will not be anony-
mous,40 4 making the institutional context of crowdfunding very
different from the conditions that led the enactment of state
Blue Sky Laws in the early 1900s and the federal securities
laws in the 1930s, when aggressive salesmen and con artists
roamed the land.0' These men used aliases and tended to "fly
by night" from one town to the next, making reputation an inef-
fective means of constraining their behavior. 06
With regard to securities crowdfunding, the social circum-
stances are very different. Entrepreneurs, investors, and man-
agement will all be identifiable, for it is the nature of the Inter-
net that all parties must create a user name and password, link
a bank account, etc., before transacting business online,07
thereby allowing every action and utterance to be monitored
and tracked. 0 s Even sophisticated Internet users who take
pains to anonymize and conceal their activity can generally be
found by determined detectives.40' The indelible data trail tying
402. See id. at 1705-06 n.13.
403. See id. at 1711.
404. While some online marketplaces or activities may be anonymous, In-
ternet-based securities crowdfunding will not be. Investors will be required to
link banking and other financial information to their online account.
405. See generally DAVID W. MAURER, THE BIG CON: THE STORY OF THE
CONFIDENCE MAN (1940) (documenting the practices of American con artists
in the early 1900s); AMY READING, THE MARK INSIDE: A PERFECT SWINDLE, A
CUNNING REVENGE, AND A SMALL HISTORY OF THE BIG CON (2012) (presenting
a history of con artist crime in the early 1900s); THE SECURITY MARKETS:
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF A SPECIAL STAFF OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND 566-69 (Alfred L. Bernheim & Margaret Grant Schneider
eds., 1935) (explaining how the problems posed by dishonest securities traders
instigated securities laws in the early 1930s).
406. See SOLOVE, supra note 391, at 141 ("When people can avoid being
identified, they can slip away from their bad reputations.").
407. Cf Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,560 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013)(notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.§ 227.402(b)(4)(iii)) (requiring that participants in online chatrooms register
with the hosting portal). In contrast, other online marketplaces, such as
craigslist, may be more prone to fraud and other forms of misbehavior because
they permit anonymous communications with no clear link to a real person,
physical address, bank account, etc.
408. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 131 (1999) (explaining
that by "using credit cards and checks (as opposed to paying cash) and [by] or-
dering merchandise over the phone and the Internet (rather than shopping in
person)," people "leave data trails that are difficult to erase or conceal").
409. See Matthew Dalton & Andrew Grossman, Arrests Signal Breach in
"Darknet," WALL ST. J., Nov. 8-9, 2014, at B1 (reporting that law enforcement
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a person to their online activity will give rise to an important
method for ameliorating information asymmetry and agency
costs by placing the online reputation of the promoters, direc-
tors and executives at stake.1 o
Online reputation will act as a signal of good companies as
well as a bonding mechanism to help ensure hard work and fi-
delity from the managers.1 With their personal reputation on
the line, managers of crowdfunded companies will have a
strong incentive to act in the shareholders' interest. This is
analogous to the traditional requirement that the incorporators
be listed on the certificate of incorporation,4 1 2 thus allowing po-
tential investors to see who is behind the company (and whose
reputation should suffer if the company squanders their in-
vestments). This may have made sense when investors and di-
rectors knew each other from face-to-face interaction, but in the
modern world people earn and maintain their reputation
through their online presence.
This can all be seen as one instance of a larger "reputation
revolution" whereby "the anonymity and pseudonymity that
once characterized our interactions with strangers is fading.,413
This revolution is playing out in many spheres, including con-
sumer contracting,1 and the ideas presented here are in accord
with this larger phenomenon. One manifestation of this phe-
nomenon is the suggestion that there be a "right to be forgot-
ten" on the Internet, which has been recognized in Europe but
pointedly denied in the United States.4 1 5
authorities "shut dozens of illegal websites and arrested some operators" by
"piercing the anonymity offered by Tor, a network that relies on encryption
tools and 1,000s of servers to mask online activities").
410. But see Hurt, supra note 16, at 252 ("'[Lleaving town' with fools' mon-
ey is easier when there is no town.").
411. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 153 (defining all efforts
to address agency costs as either monitoring by principals or bonding by
agents).
412. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(5) (2015) (mandating that a cer-
tificate of incorporation must include the "name and mailing address of the
incorporator or incorporators").
413. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiqui-
tous Personal Information, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1667, 1670-71 (2008).
414. See Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality:
The Case of Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 702 (2012) (citing
Strahilevitz, supra note 401, and Strahilevitz, supra note 413).
415. Compare Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espatiola de
Protecci6n de Datos, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, at 88 (May 13, 2014) (Court
of Justice of the European Union recognizing a "right to be forgotten"), with
Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right To Be For-
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On the whole, online reputation should work well to ad-
dress information asymmetry and agency costs in the
crowdfunding context. There are limits, however, including an
inability of the crowd to detect shirking that does not lead to
disastrous results. If the company does fine, but could have
done great, the entrepreneur is unlikely to pay a reputational
fine. As such, reputation may be more effective at addressing
malfeasance than slacking.
Online reputation can be thought of in two senses, informal
and formal. The former refers to the amalgamation of all Inter-
net references to a person, including blog posts, social media,
and everything else. The latter refers to reputation feedback
systems, such as the "star" ratings used on Amazon and eBay.
The role that each type of online reputation may play in reduc-
ing information asymmetry and agency costs in crowdfunding
is considered in the following two subsections.
1. Disaggregated Online Reputation'16
The management of crowdfunded companies can be disci-
plined by the prospect that if they shirk, provide themselves
with excessive compensation, or otherwise impose agency costs
on their investors, they will be pilloried in the "blogosphere"
and their online reputation will suffer.417 The management of
crowdfunding companies will be relatively easy to track down
because all activity will take place on the Internet, where they
will create a digital record and a trail to their door.4 18 The pro-
spect of a sullied online reputation can help reduce the agency
costs of crowdfunding by disciplining management to act in the
shareholders' interest. This sort of discipline already takes
gotten To Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 349, 355
(2015) (explaining that the European Union's "right to be forgotten" has "failed
to develop under United States law" because it is "antithetical to the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution").
416. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY
AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004) (exploring and discussing the
implications of emerging online technologies on privacy and public profile).
417. Cf Hamermesh & Tsoflias, supra note 130, at 485 ("[Ihf you commit
fraud on [an online investment portal], your whole social network is going to
know about it. Your future employers will know about it when they check your
Facebook page. That cute girl you met in the bar is going to know about it
when you and she 'friend' each other on Facebook. Your entire life on Face-
book, which occurs in public, is now linked to your securities offering." (quot-
ing Professor Robert Miller)).
418. See id.
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place in public markets, where activist shareholders employ so-
cial media to criticize and influence corporate management.4 19
More relevant for present purposes, online reputation is
widely used to discipline people who engage in reward
crowdfunding.420 Kickstarter specifically warns users that
"[11aunching a Kickstarter is a very public act, and creators put
their reputations at risk when they do."4 21 In one recent case,
apparel company Radiate Athletics raised substantial funds on
Kickstarter but then was overwhelmed by orders and fell badly
behind schedule, leading many disappointed patrons to com-
plain on the Internet. 4 2 2 "The problem mushroomed into a pub-
lic relations fiasco after angry Kickstarter backers, [sic] posted
complaints on Facebook, Twitter and other websites. In the
past 30 days alone, nearly 250 messages about Radiate have
been posted on Twitter, nearly all complaints ....
Moreover, it seems likely that some promoters of
crowdfunding companies will provide hyperlinks in their offer-
ing to their Facebook, LinkedIn or other social media account
as both a signal and a bonding mechanism. Such a hyperlink
effectively says to investors, "You can trust and expect that I
will act responsibly with your investment, because the good
name of my digital persona hangs in the balance." This method
of linking to social media is already used in reward
crowdfunding; on Indiegogo, for instance, people seeking fund-
ing can obtain a "Verified Facebook Badge" by linking their Fa-
cebook and Indiegogo account.424 The purpose, according to
Indiegogo, is to reduce information asymmetry: "We think it's
useful to have information that you may find helpful as you de-
cide who to interact with on Indiegogo.... These additional
pieces of information can help inform contributors' decisions
about contributing to a campaign on Indiegogo."425
419. See Kristyn Hyland, Activist Investors Increasingly Use Social Media
To Further Their Causes, BLOOMBERG BNA NEWS (Oct. 31, 2014), http:/
www.bna.com/activist-investors-increasingly-nl7179910807.
420. See, e.g., Angus Loten, Kickstarter Push Overwhelms Entrepreneur,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2014, at B5 (reporting about how an entrepreneur's
reputation suffered after he was unable to give promised rewards to his
Kickstarter investors).
421. Kickstarter Basics, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/
faq/kickstarter%20basics (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
422. Loten, supra note 420.
423. Id.
424. About Verifications, INDIEGOGO, https://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en
-us/articles/202179638-About-Verifications (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
425. Id.
6752015]1
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
It is certainly true, as some privacy scholars emphasize,
that there are downsides to this method of addressing the three
problems of investing.426 Their valid concerns over so-called "In-
ternet shaming" include a lack of due process and the prospect
of vigilantism.4 27 Yet even critics acknowledge that "Internet
shaming has many benefits," and are apparently most opposed
to the practice when it is used for violations of norms.' Yet in
crowdfunding, legal obligations such as fiduciary duties and
contractual covenants will be at stake.
2. Reputation Feedback Systems
Separate from the broad Internet-wide reputation of a per-
son, digital shareholders may benefit from a crowdfunding-
specific "reputation feedback system," akin to the star system
used on eBay or Amazon.4' A reputation feedback system is an
online mechanism where "users of a network provide feedback
about the performance of other network members" that is com-
piled and presented for the benefit of future users.4 10 Reputa-
tion feedback systems are crucial to the functioning of online
marketplaces and may even be "among the most im portant
forms of social production to emerge in the last decade. "
Most reputation feedback systems use what are called
"Likert-type" scales. 32 Such scales allow respondents to rate
their experience on a discrete scale (e.g., rating a seller one,
two, or three).'4" Reputation feedback systems then aggregate
these ratings in some way and publicize the result. 3 ' Many
reputation feedback systems display textual comments as
well.435
426. See generally SOLOVE, supra note 391, at 94-102 (identifying some
problems posed by Internet shaming).
427. See id. at 96-101.
428. See id. at 92.
429. See, e.g., About Comments, Feedback, & Ratings, AMAZON, http://
www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeld=537806 (last visited
Nov. 2, 2015).
430. YOcHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUC-
TION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 131 (2007).
431. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472,
1506 (2007).
432. Dawn G. Gregg, Outline Reputation Scores: How Well Are They Un-
derstood?, 50 J. COMPUTER INFO. SYS. 90, 91 (2009).
433. See id.
434. See id.
435. See About Comments, Feedback, & Ratings, supra note 429.
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Reputation feedback systems translate the benefits of rep-
utation in traditional marketplaces to online marketplaces.
Thus, they perform three main functions: they encourage con-
sumers to partake in internet transactions despite risk and the
possibility of fraud, they decrease the risk and likelihood of
fraud associated with anonymous interactions, and they allow
consumers to have trust not only in their specific business
partner, but also in the marketplace as a whole. Since reputa-
tion feedback systems help consumers decide whom to trust in
online market places, consumers would theoretically avoid
those sellers which were more likely to put them at risk based
on their past behavior. As a result, sellers would try to avoid
having a bad reputation in these feedback systems so as to
avoid not being able to do business.
The reputation feedback systems currently, in use can be
adapted for use in the crowdfunding arena.4 ' For instance, in-
vestors could be asked to rate their level of satisfaction with the
investment with one to five "stars" at launch and, perhaps, an-
nually thereafter. Over time, companies with low scores will
find it hard to garner interest from the crowd for future rounds
of fundraising. This all has the beneficial effect of encouraging
good behavior by managers, and some level of monitoring by
portals.3 Moreover, systems like these have extremely low
costs-a key concern for crowdfunding-especially because they
can be easily scaled. Finally, the SEC appears to have authori-
ty under the JOBS Act to require or recommend the use of rep-
utation feedback systems as a way to protect investors.438
A linchpin of reputation feedback systems is having repeat
players.4 " They work well on eBay or Amazon, where sellers
make many sales and want to maintain a high reputation score
to ensure future business. But many, perhaps most,
crowdfunding companies will be one-time players, seeking
funding just once and never returning to the crowdfunding
market. For such companies, a reputation feedback system will
likely not be of much use, at least not beyond the broad reputa-
tion effects discussed in the previous subsection.
436. See Tomboc, supra note 14, at 270.
437. The system is not perfect, of course, as many crowdfunding companies
will not have any future rounds of fundraising. In particular, the most prob-
lematic companies may never be heard from again.
438. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a) (2012).
439. See generally Gilson, supra note 17, at 1086 (stating that anticipating
repeated future transactions is an attribute in the operation of reputation
markets).
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There is, however, at least one repeat player in the
crowdfunding marketplace: the funding portals and broker-
dealers through which every transaction must be made. These
intermediaries want investors to have a good experience so
they will return to invest again on their website, making them
sensitive to a reputation feedback system. A funding portal
with lots of poorly rated companies will find it difficult to at-
tract future users to its site. Importantly, this appears to be an
effective constraint for existing reward crowdfunding sites,
such as Indiegogo, which take care to avoid having their mar-
kets overrun by malfeasance.440 A reputation feedback system
that allowed for comparison between platforms could play a
useful role in addressing the agency costs of crowdfunding, but
the simple flow of business may be sufficient even without such
a system.
Finally, another set of repeat players is the entrepreneurs
and promoters behind the startups seeking funding. An entre-
preneur that successfully finances one startup through
crowdfunding may well be back months or years later to seek
funding for another startup. This phenomenon of serial entre-
preneurship is common in the context of VC and angel invest-
ing,4 4 ' and if it were to carry over to crowdfunding there would
exist a set of people who are repeat players with a strong inter-
est in maintaining a good online reputation.
To summarize this Section, the importance in the modern
world of maintaining a good online reputation can be used to
reduce both information asymmetry and agency costs in
crowdfunding.
D. SECURITIES-BASED COMPENSATION
Although it is sometimes called "equity crowdfunding,"
startups will be allowed to sell any type of security they wish,
not just equity or common stock.4 2 Furthermore, there is good
reason to expect that many crowdfunding companies will sell a
variety of other types of securities, including unusual variants
440. See supra text accompanying note 11.
441. See Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs
and Small Business Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2312 (2005)
("The owner-operator's human capital is not tied to any particular business
enterprise; it can be redeployed when opportunities outside the existing enter-
prise are more attractive than those inside, which is precisely why most en-
trepreneurs are serial entrepreneurs.").
442. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1482.
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that will be unfamiliar to potential investors, such as
"unequity"4"3 or "safe."4"
The use of strange securities will create information
asymmetry because the entrepreneur will generally understand
the security she is selling much better than will the digital
shareholders considering buying it. This information asym-
metry could be a significant hurdle for entrepreneurs to over-
come, as the investors will be understandably skeptical of buy-
ing a security that is something other than common stock.
To overcome this information asymmetry, crowdfunding
entrepreneurs can accept as managerial compensation the
same security that is for sale to the crowd. By committing her-
self to being paid primarily with the precise security being of-
fered, an entrepreneur can assure the crowd that the security is
worth buying. A promise of this sort to "eat its own cooking"
should help reduce information asymmetry and help
crowdfunding function.4 4 5 It must be acknowledged, however,
that the literature on executive compensation shows how chal-
lenging it is to design an effective system." Even so, this tech-
nique would appear to help crowdfunding address the funda-
mental problem of information asymmetry.
This idea of securities-based compensation is novel but
closely related to the equity-based compensation used in VC
companies. What is different here is that management is com-
pensated using the very same security sold to investors. In VC,
the investors buy convertible preferred stock and the entrepre-
neur is paid in straight common stock. Here, both the digital
shareholders and the entrepreneur/manager will receive the
same security, of whatever type.
E. DIGITAL MONITORING
It is well known that information asymmetry and agency
costs can be reduced if the principal monitors the agent. Moni-
toring is used by angels (who actively participate in the busi-
ness), 4 47 VCs (who sit on the board), 4 4 8 and public shareholders
443. Heminway, supra note 211.
444. Here, "safe" is an acronym for "simple agreement for future equity."
Startup Documents, YCOMBINATOR.COM (Mar. 2015), httpsf//www.ycombinator
.com/documents.
445. The potential tax implications for this form of compensation are be-
yond the scope of this Article.
446. See generally supra notes 301-04 and accompanying text.
447. See supra Part III.B.2.
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(who have access to voluminous disclosure)449 to address these
problems, but these traditional methods of monitoring will not
translate to crowdfunding. 4so Even if they did, these techniques
are far too costly for digital shareholders with only hundreds of
dollars at stake to use. The Internet allows for extremely inex-
pensive monitoring, however, meaning that digital sharehold-
ers can employ high-tech but low-cost methods to monitor the
management of the companies in which they invest.
In the analog world, most investor monitoring of manage-
ment was expensive and time consuming. An investor that vis-
ited the company's office on a typical workday would surely
learn valuable information, such as how many hours people
spend at work, and the mere specter of such a visit would help
reduce agency costs. But flying across the country to pay a per-
sonal visit is a very costly proposition. Similarly, many public
shareholders would surely value attending a public company's
annual meeting, but almost none actually show up because of
the time and expense of doing so.
In the digital world, by contrast, investor monitoring can
be accomplished at exceedingly low cost. Relevant business in-
formation, such as sales or customers, can be posted to a web-
site in real time.452 Managers can conduct regular telepresence
meetings with investors using technologies such as Google Chat
and Apple FaceTime that allow for real-time multi-point com-
munication. Employees could electronically clock in and out
when they arrive and depart from their workstations and this
information could be continuously uploaded to a website avail-
able to investors or a webcam can be installed that live-streams
a view of the office to the Internet. 453 Investors can use tools
448. See supra Part III.A.3.
449. See supra Part III.C.1.
450. See supra Part III.
451. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 838-39 (2013).
452. This concept goes beyond crowdfunding and may be applied to ordi-
nary public companies. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Information Is Not a Crime,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2015, at A9 ("[Tihis is the time to use technology to lib-
erate information [regarding public company performance because] companies
increasingly are able to track sales, expenses and other key drivers in real
time."); Andy Kessler, Instead ofAttacking Insider Trading, Make Everyone an
Insider, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2015, at A13 (suggesting that the SEC force pub-
lic companies to "post product sales information more often-every day or even
in real time").
453. For example, the design firm Sagmeister & Walsh presently has a live
webcam filming the office at all times. See SAGMEISTER & WALSH, httpJ/www
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like Google's "Street View" feature to take a look around the
neighborhood, even from a thousand miles away." Many other
examples could be given, and new ones will be developed that
are not even conceivable at this time. The key point is that all
of these digital monitoring techniques cost next to nothing to
implement."'
The power of digital monitoring is analogous to urban bicy-
cle-sharing programs.' Bike sharing originated in European
cities in the 1960s.4" These early systems were free and anon-
ymous; there was no record of who checked out which bike,
making it impossible to monitor their behavior.'5 These early
systems failed because the bicycles were promptly stolen or de-
stroyed,'4 5 as might have been expected with no way to place
responsibility for a given bike on a specific person. Even as late
as the 1990s, free and anonymous bike sharing systems were
launched in cities including Cambridge in the United Kingdom
.sagmeisterwalsh.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). Depending on the type of
business, however, a webcam may give a distorted view of effort, for instance if
employees spend productive hours off-site. Also, one might question whether
digital shareholders with small investments will be willing to sit and watch
hours of video streams. Experience shows, however, that people are willing to
engage in such crowdsourced activities well beyond what a strict understand-
ing of economic rationality might suggest. See, e.g., GALAXY ZOO,
http://www.galaxyzoo.org/#/story (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (describing a
crowdsourced astronomy project involving more than 150,000 volunteers who
collectively contributed "more than 50 million classifications [of galaxies]").
454. For one thing, Street View makes it difficult to pass off a vacant lot as
an operating business, as would have been possible in the pre-digital age. See,
e.g., Sibley v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 36 S.W.2d 145, 145-46 (Tex. 1931) (find-
ing fraud by a seller who claimed that a certain lot had a "brick dwelling
house" upon it when in fact it was a vacant).
455. This refers to direct costs to implement. If, for example, competitors
can use the monitoring system to wrest an advantage from the issuer, that
would clearly count as a cost of the system. However, it seems that manage-
ment would be cognizant of this possibility and arrange any monitoring sys-
tem so that it provides no assistance to competitors. This may limit to some
extent the utility of the monitoring system but such a trade-off must be made.
456. Bike Sharing, PEDESTRIAN & BICYCLE INFO. CTR., http://www
.pedbikeinfo.org/programs/promote-bikeshare.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2015)
("Bike sharing is an innovative transportation program, ideal for short dis-
tance point-to-point trips providing users the ability to pick up a bicycle at any
self-serve bike-station and return it to any other bike station located within
the system's service area.").
457. See Susan A. Shaheen et al., Bikesharing in Europe, the Americas, and
Asia, 2143 TRANSP. RES. REC. 159, 160 (2010).
458. Id.
459. Id. (recounting the history of bike sharing and describing the 1965
White Bike Plan in Amsterdam where the fifty white bikes "were often stolen
or damaged," leading the Plan to "fail] soon after its launch").
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(1993) and Boulder, Colorado (1995). In each case the systems
were cancelled due to bike theft.460
In the 2000s, however, bike-sharing has become a well-
functioning phenomenon in many cities around the world, in-
cluding Paris, New York, and Washington, D.C.46  What
changed from the 1990s to the 2000s? A revolution in infor-
mation technology that allowed for effective and inexpensive
monitoring of bike-sharers. Bike-share system designers
learned from experience that "user anonymity created a system
that was prone to bicycle theft," and responded by introducing
tech-based systems that require people to swipe their personal
credit card (or electronic smartcard) to release a bike, thereby
creating a digital tether between the renter and the bike.4 62
This method "records user identification information as well as
bike usage (e.g., time, duration, location, kilometers). This im-
provement solved previous issues of user anonymity and facili-
tated bicycle tracking, which reduced bicycle theft and vandal-
ism."4 6 3 Thanks to this digital tracking, few bikes are lost or
damaged and the systems now work well.464 This applies direct-
ly to crowdfunding, where everything will take place on the In-
ternet, thereby leaving a digital trail that can be easily moni-
tored and significantly reducing agency costs.
Digital monitoring, although new and different, can be
highly effective at addressing information asymmetry and
agency costs, especially when combined with crowdsourcing.465
Consider plagiarism. In the paper era, it would be very difficult
to determine whether a given book or article was plagiarized,
as it required a careful comparison of the two hard copies. In
the digital age, by contrast, plagiarism is exceedingly easy to
detect thanks to the availability of electronic methods such as
the "compare" function on Microsoft Word. This has led to
many instances these days of high-profile authors being re-
460. Id. at 160-61 (contrasting the failures of programs in Cambridge,
U.K., and Boulder, Colorado, with the rare success of a free and anonymous
system in La Rochelle, France).
461. Boulder has a well-functioning system today. See BOULDER B-CYCLE,
https//boulder.bcycle.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
462. Shaheen et al., supra note 457, at 165.
463. Id.
464. There is no indication that increased penalties or other variables de-
serve anywhere near as much credit as technological development. See gener-
ally id. at 165-66 (emphasizing the technological innovations that have fur-
thered the next generation of bike-sharing systems).
465. See supra Part IV.B.
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vealed as plagiarists, including Senator John Walsh,466 scientist
Jane Goodall,4 67 German Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu
Guttenberg,"' and Harvard undergraduate Kaavya
Viswanathan,4 69 just to name a few.
Consider the related issue of an author who tries to pass
off a false memoir as a true account of her life. There was a
time when it was difficult to know whether a memoir was true
or false. In 1971, the book Go Ask Alice was presented as a real-
life diary of a teenage girl who gets in trouble with drugs.4 70
Over the years, various people have questioned whether it was
a real diary, but to this day no one seems to know for sure.47 In
the Internet age, things are very different. Contrast Go Ask Al-
ice with the 2003 book, A Million Little Pieces, presented by au-
thor James Frey as a true account of his problems with alcohol
and drugs.472 The book was endorsed by Oprah Winfrey and be-
came a best seller. Within weeks of hitting the top of the chart,
it was debunked by online sleuths as a fabrication.7
466. See Jonathan Martin, Senator's Thesis Turns Out To Be Remix of Oth-
ers' Works, Uncited, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2014, at Al.
467. See Steven Levingston, Portions of Goodall's "Seeds" Were Lifted from
Other Works, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2013, at C1.
468. See Tony Paterson, German Defence Minister Quits over PhD Plagia-
rism Scandal, INDEP. (Oct. 22, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/europe/german-defence-minister-quits-over-phd-plagiarism-scandal
-2229492.html.
469. See David Zhou, Student's Novel Faces Plagiarism Controversy, HARV.
CRIMSON (Apr. 23, 2006), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2006/4/23/
students-novel-faces-plagiarism-controversy-beditors.
470. BEATRICE SPARKS, Go ASK ALICE (1971).
471. See Context, Go Ask Alice, SPARKNOTES, https://www.sparknotes.com/
litigoaskalice/context.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (raising but not resolving
the question of authorship).
472. JAMES FREY, A MILLION LITTLE PIECES (2003).
473. See A Million Little Lies: Exposing James Frey's Fiction Addiction,
SMOKING GUN (Jan. 8, 2006, 5:43 PM), http://www.thesmokinggun.com/
documents/celebrity/million-little-lies. See generally Carol Memmott, Author's
"Love and Consequences" Memoir Untrue, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 2008, at 2D;
Neda Ulaby, "Tea" Debacle Reflects the Murky Waters of Memoirs, NPR (Apr.
19, 2011), https*//www.npr.org/2011/04/19/135541513/tea-debacle-reflects-the
-murky-waters-of-memoirs ("[T]he noble old world of publishing has not yet
adapted to a digital age-where fact-checking is sport and results spread
smoking gun-style over the Internet."). Other examples of memoirs revealed to
be fiction in the digital era include MISHA DEFONSECA, MISHA: A MEMOIR OF
THE HOLOCAUST YEARS (1997), MARGARET B. JONES, LOVE AND CONSEQUENC-
ES (2008), NORMA KHOURI, HONOR LOST: LOVE AND DEATH IN MODERN-DAY
JORDAN (2003), and DAVID OLIVER RELIN & GREG MORTENSON, THREE CUPS
OF TEA (2006). Memniott, supra.
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Beyond memoirs, many other examples exist of lies being
revealed as such in the Internet age. Reporter Jayson Blair
faked a number of news stories writing for the New York
Times.474 NBC News anchor Brian Williams claimed for a dec-
ade that he was in a helicopter that came under fire while on
assignment in Iraq; that story was debunked as false in 2015
after military personnel who were there raised their doubts
1*475online.
The point is that modern Internet sleuthing creates a very
different atmosphere than in the past when secrets stood a
much better chance of being kept quiet. Franklin D. Roosevelt
famously went his entire presidency without the American
people seeing him in a wheelchair.4 " Had he lived in a digital
age, this would have been impossible. His condition would have
immediately become common knowledge simply because secrets
and lies are very hard to maintain in a digital age.
Finally, one of the strengths of digital monitoring is that it
can be amplified through crowdsourcing. Just as potential in-
vestors can crowdsource information before buying in,7 they
can also crowdsource information after they have invested.
Crowdsourced monitoring responds to the concern that each in-
vestor will lack the incentive to monitor because she has only a
small amount at stake. By sharing the burden of monitoring
among the entire crowd of digital shareholders, each person can
contribute just a bit, but the collective effort can have a power-
ful effect.
Crowdsourced monitoring could take place through a
chatroom or website established by the company or the portal,
but that is not necessarily the case.478 Furthermore, all the
same arguments discussed in Part IV.B above apply here, but
even more so because investors have rights to additional infor-
mation. For example, shareholders have the authority to re-
474. See Times Reporter Who Resigned Leaves Long Trail of Deception,
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2003, at Al.
475. See Joe Flint, NBC News Anchor Williams Draws Criticism for False
Tale, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2015, at B2. Williams was subsequently suspended
for six months. Joe Flint, NBC Suspends "Nightly News" Anchor Brian Wil-
liams for Six Months, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2015, at Al.
476. See HUGH G. GALLAGHER, FDR's SPLENDID DECEPTION 88-105, 207-
16 (1985).
477. See supra Part IV.B.
478. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,530 (proposed Nov. 5,
2013) (notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 200, 227, 232, 239-240, 249) (recognizing that investors may participate
in additional discussions on external websites).
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quest books and records from the corporation for any proper
purpose.479 Hence, even if a company would prefer not to share
information with the crowdfund investors, it may be forced to
do so by a books-and-records request. 48 0 A group of people work-
ing together and sharing information via an online chat group,
especially armed with the power to demand books and records,
can be a powerful force to ameliorate information asymmetry
and agency costs in the crowdfunding context.
In summary, digital monitoring will be a powerful means
of addressing information asymmetry and especially agency
costs in crowdfunding.
CONCLUSION
This Article claims that crowdfunding can overcome the
three fundamental problems of entrepreneurial finance and
succeed using digital methods that are different from those
used by VCs, angel investors, or public companies. In doing so,
it makes at least three novel contributions to the crowdfunding
literature and corporate and securities law more generally.
First, it describes the distinctive way in which the three fun-
damental problems of finance will express themselves in
crowdfunding's unique context.4 8 ' Second, it reviews the signifi-
cant solutions to the trio of problems employed in the analogous
contexts of VC, angel investing, and public companies, and de-
termines their relevance for crowdfunding.482 Third, it introduc-
es a set of new and promising digital methods to address the
trio of problems in crowdfunding.4 " The next step is simply to
wait and see what happens once the SEC finishes its work and
crowdfunding commences.
479. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b)(1)-(2) (2011) ("Any stockhold-
er, in person or by attorney or other agent, ... shall ... have the right ... to
inspect ... the corporation's stock ledger, a list of its stockholders, and its oth-
er books and records."); JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 2 TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 13:3 (3d ed. 2011) ("A shareholder has a common
law right to inspect corporate books and records, in person or by agent, for a
proper purpose in order to protect the shareholder's interest.").
480. Cf Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1484-86 (suggesting that the costs as-
sociated with the shareholder right to demand books and records is a reason
for companies to refrain from selling common stock via crowdfunding).
481. See supra Part II.
482. See supra Part III.
483. See supra Part IV.
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